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INTRODUCTION 
During the 2007-08 financial crisis, the federal government created 
a series of bailout programs.1 By providing powerful liquidity to financial 
institutions and creating markets for certain financial products, these 
bailout programs effectively quelled the unprecedented market panic.2 
Years later, people’s understanding of these bailout programs has evolved 
from the initial criticism of “wealth transfer” to a reflective inquiry about 
the necessity and correctness of these programs. 3  As media reports 
revealed that the government made billions in profits from the Troubled 
Asset Relief Program (“TARP”), one of the most notorious bailout 
programs, people started to wonder whether the 2007-08 bailouts were, 
in fact, good investments.4 As the government gradually exited these 
programs and made the complete transaction data publicly available, it 
became possible to answer this question by calculating the nominal and 
percentage return for each program. 
When assessing the investment value of the bailout programs, the 
rate of return has a two-fold significance. First, while the government 
presents gain or loss in nominal dollars, what investors truly care about is 
the percentage return.5 From an investor’s perspective, even if a bailout 
program has made a fortune, if its percentage return is below the market 
																																																																																																																																
 1. See The Federal Bailout, 2008 FIN. CRISIS & GLOBAL RECESSION, 
http://2008financialcrisis.umwblogs.org/analysis/the-federal-bailout/ [https://perma.cc/4 
QEL-X8SW]. 
 2. See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Remarks at the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Kansas City’s Annual Economic Symposium: Reflections on a Year of Crisis 
(Aug. 21, 2009), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090821 
a.htm [https://perma.cc/YP9B-5JC8]. 
 3. See Ellen Brown, Financial Meltdown: The Greatest Transfer of Wealth in 
History, GLOBAL RES. (Oct. 17, 2008), http://www.globalresearch.ca/financial-meltdown 
-the-greatest-transfer-of-wealth-in-history/10589 [https://perma.cc/5V6H-S6SM]. But 
see Jonathan Yip, The Bank Bailout in Perspective, HARV. POL. REV. (Oct. 24, 2011), 
http://harvardpolitics.com/arusa/the-bank-bailout-in-perspective/ [https://perma.cc/E3G 
4-ETFP]. 
 4. See Chris Isidore, U.S. Ends TARP with $15.3 Billion Profit, CNN MONEY (Dec. 
19, 2014), http://money.cnn.com/2014/12/19/news/companies/government-bailouts-end/ 
[https://perma.cc/FV4D-JPE8]; Wayne Duggan, Financial Crisis Bailouts Have Earned 
Taxpayers Billions, U.S. NEWS (Jan. 19, 2017), http://money.usnews.com/investing/articl 
es/2017-01-19/financial-crisis-bailouts-have-earned-taxpayers-billions [https://perma.cc 
/6MAQ-T2KH]. 
 5. See Return on Investment, INC., https://www.inc.com/encyclopedia/return-on-
investment-roi.html [https://perma.cc/QH5B-HRWP]. 
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rate, it would not be considered a good investment. On the other hand, if 
a program shows a rate of return that is above the market rate, then it may 
be deemed a good investment for the government. Secondly, the rate of 
return provides a measurement to judge the degree of compliance of the 
bailouts with the rule governing the lender of last resort, i.e., Bagehot’s 
dictum.6 Since Bagehot’s dictum prescribes charging high interest rates 
on loans provided by the Federal Reserve (“Fed”), a bailout program 
should generate a rate of return that is above the market rate.7 In this 
sense, the rate of return also functions as an indicator of how well 
Bagehot’s dictum has been honored. 
The rate of return for the 2007-08 bailout programs is not directly 
available. Generally, for programs for which the government has 
provided the dollar amount of gain or loss, the annual rate of return8 can 
be obtained by using the data and calculating the exact number of days 
during which transactions have occurred.9  Calculation becomes more 
complicated when the program does not provide the actual dollar amount 
of the gain or loss.10  In that case, the dollar amount of gain or loss must 
																																																																																																																																
 6. See generally Walter Bagehot, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE 
MONEY MARKET (London, Henry S. King & Co. 1873). For over a century, Bagehot’s 
advice has been considered the guiding rule for the lender of last resort during a credit 
crunch, also referred to as “Bagehot’s dictum.” See Brian F. Madigan, Dir., Fed. Reserve 
Bd. Div. of Monetary Affairs, Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s 
Annual Economic Symposium: Bagehot’s Dictum in Practice: Formulating and 
Implementing Policies to Combat the Financial Crisis (Aug. 21, 2009), https://www.feder 
alreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/madigan20090821a.htm [https://perma.cc/HQW8-ZW 
QJ].  
 7. See generally Anthony Casey & Eric Posner, A Framework for Bailout 
Regulation, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479, 531 (2016) (arguing that the application of 
Bagehot’s dictum requires that the government should charge a price somewhat higher 
than what would prevail in a normal market). 
 8. Annual return is a better measure for evaluating the investment because it 
accounts for how many days investors are taking the risk. See Annual Return, 
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/annual-return.asp [https://perma.c 
c/6ESL-YYE2]. 
 9. The number of days cannot simply be obtained by counting the number of days 
between the beginning day and the ending day of a program. If no transactions occurred 
on some days, these days need to be excluded from the total number of days used in the 
calculation. The exact number of days can be obtained by examining the data of 
transactions. 
 10. Those programs are: the Modified Discount Window, infra Section II.A.1, the 
Term Auction Facility, infra Section II.A.2, the Central Bank Liquidity Swap, infra 
Section II.A.3, the Single-Tranche Term Repurchase Agreement, infra Section II.A.4, 
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first be calculated based on the transaction data released by the 
government.11 It becomes more difficult when the government’s original 
investment has been converted into financial products that have not yet 
been liquidated. In that case, not only is the dollar amount of gain or loss 
unavailable, but the fact that each portfolio will contain illiquid financial 
products that do not have a daily price also makes it hard to evaluate the 
true dollar value of the portfolio. For instance, because the government 
has yet to liquidate the MBS portfolio,12 no dollar amount of gain or loss 
has been provided for the Agency Mortgage-Backed Securities (“MBS”) 
Purchase Program.13 Despite this lack of information, this Comment will 
estimate both the dollar amount of gain or loss and the rate of return by 
matching the portfolio information with the current market price.14 By 
filling this informational gap, this Comment makes it possible to provide 
a comprehensive view in regards to both the dollar amount of gain or loss 
and the percentage return for all the bailout programs. 
In addition to providing a solid basis for judging each program’s 
investment value in terms of a calculated gain or loss and percentage 
return, this Comment will also analyze the regulatory implications of such 
a calculation. The 2007-08 bailouts were created under the authority of 
several federal statutes.15  In particular, many of these programs were 
created under the Fed’s emergency lending authority pursuant to Section 
13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act (“the Act”),16 an authority that the Fed 
																																																																																																																																
the Term Securities Lending Facility, infra Section II.A.5, the Primary Dealer Credit 
Facility, infra Section II.A.6, the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market 
Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility, infra Section II.D.2, and the Commercial Paper Funding 
Facility, infra Section II.D.3. 
 11. The detailed steps of calculation will be explained throughout this Note as each 
program is introduced. 
 12. See MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MONETARY POLICY AND THE 
FEDERAL RESERVE: CURRENT POLICY AND CONDITIONS 19 (2016) (“Fed ruled out MBS 
sales and . . . continued rolling over maturing securities.”). 
 13. See infra Section II.D.4. 
 14. Since the government has released the data of transactions for this program, the 
portfolio information can be obtained from the date of transactions. See Agency 
Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) Purchase Program, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. 
RESERVE SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_mbs.htm [https://per 
ma.cc/G4VP-BXE5]. Using a Bloomberg terminal, I tracked those portfolios and 
matched them with the current market price. See infra Section II.D.4. 
 15. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 343(3B), 347b, 353, 1823 (2012). 
 16. 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2012). 
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had not invoked for about seventy-six years prior to the financial crisis.17 
Notwithstanding the magnitude of the crisis, the Fed’s intensive use of its 
emergency lending authority was considered problematic; as a result, 
many bailout programs have been criticized as governmental intervention 
that creates a “moral hazard,” which, allegedly, would encourage private 
companies to take excessive risk.18  To prevent the creation of moral 
hazard in the future, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) in July 2010.19 
Engraved with the theme of “anti-bailout,” Dodd-Frank contains many 
provisions that aim to reduce the power of federal officials to create new 
bailout programs or facilities.20 The amendments made by Dodd-Frank 
will render the creation of many bailout programs that are similar to the 
2007-08 bailouts extremely difficult, if not impossible, in the future.21 
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that these limits on the government’s bailout 
powers will benefit the taxpayers.22 This Comment argues that Dodd-
Frank reflects an overly hasty decision by Congress. When Congress 
enacted the statute in July 2010, there was not yet a reason to believe that 
the investments in the bailouts would be profitable.23  If the 2007-08 
bailouts have indeed been proven to be good investments, as 
demonstrated by the calculations in this Comment, then this type of value-
creating government intervention should not be curtailed. Given the 
effectiveness of the 2007-08 bailouts in preventing the economy’s 
																																																																																																																																
 17. See John L. Walker, Emergency Tools to Contain A Financial Crisis, 35 REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 672, 722 (2016). 
 18. See Richard Squire, Illiquidity vs. Insolvency in the 2008 Crisis and the 
Congressional Imagination, in CRISI FINANZIARIA RIPOSTE NORMATIVE: VERSO UN 
NUOVO DIRITTO DELL’ECONOMICA? 93, 94-95, (M. Maugeri & A. Guaccero, eds., 2014). 
 19. See Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 7, 12, and 15 U.S.C. (2012)). 
 20. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5394(a), 8305, 1851-52; see Squire, supra note 18, at 105, 113 
(summarizing the “anti-bailout” provisions as a new “orderly liquidation authority” in 
Dodd-Frank § 214(a), the Volcker Rule in § 619, the “swaps pushout rule” in § 716, the 
“concentration limits” in § 622, and the “Pay-It-Back Act” in § 1302). 
 21. For instance, the amendments to Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act will 
likely render the bailout of individual institutions, such as the bailout of AIG and Bear 
Stearns, impossible. See infra Section III.C.3. 
 22. See generally Squire, supra note 18 (arguing that Dodd-Frank’s anti-
interconnectedness and anti-bailouts provisions will unlikely serve the purpose of 
preparing for the next financial crisis). 
 23. See Squire, supra note 18, at 93. 
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breakdown at large, the government’s bailout authority should be 
preserved. 
While many papers have been written about the 2007-08 bailouts, 
none have looked at all programs together in one single study. 24 
Moreover, none of the papers have presented the rate of return for each 
program, presumably due to the burdensome work of calculating the rate 
and the lack of necessary information.25 To fill this gap, this Comment 
provides a comprehensive view by analyzing all programs together: by 
presenting both the dollar amount of return and the rate of return, this 
Comment also provides a better sense of whether a particular bailout was 
a good investment of taxpayer money. In addition, in light of Dodd-
Frank’s amendments to the government’s bailout authorities, this 
Comment will examine how relevant provisions of Dodd-Frank will 
affect a particular bailout program. Part I provides a theoretical basis for 
understanding the bailouts by introducing the general function of bailouts, 
the guiding principle for creating specific bailout measures, as well as the 
government’s legal authority for creating bailout programs. Part II 
presents the dollar amount of gain or loss for each bailout program. By 
dividing all of the bailout programs into five types, this part classifies 
each bailout program by examining the economic motivation for the 
creation of such mechanisms, as well as their interconnectedness with 
other bailout mechanisms. More importantly, for the amounts that are not 
readily available, this Part calculates the dollar amounts of each bailout’s 
gains or losses. Part III summarizes the bailouts through a threefold 
analysis, which considers the gain/loss and rate of return of all programs, 
the application of Bagehot’s dictum, as well as the potential impact of 
relevant Dodd-Frank provisions. By presenting comprehensive 
information regarding the gain/loss and percentage return, this Comment 
fills the informational gap based on which the overly hasty decision of 
enacting Dodd-Frank was made. If the creation of the bailouts is largely 
confirmed within the guiding principle, then the curtailment of the 
																																																																																																																																
 24. See generally L. RANDALL WRAY, LEVY ECON. INST. OF BARD COLL., THE 
LENDER OF LAST RESORT: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE’S 
UNPRECEDENTED INTERVENTION AFTER 2007 (2013) (focusing on the unconventional 
bailout mechanism as well as the low interest rates charged); James Felkerson, 
$29,000,000,000,000: A Detailed Look at the Fed’s Bailout by Funding Facility and 
Recipient (Levy Econ. Inst. of Bard Coll., Working Paper No. 698, 2011) (focusing on 
an accounting of the funds spent, by facility). 
 25. This mainly refers to the unavailable information on the Agency Mortgage-
Backed Securities Purchase Program. See supra text accompanying notes 12-13. 
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government’s bailout authority is absolutely unnecessary. As a result, 
Dodd-Frank’s relevant provisions that aim to curtail the government’s 
bailout authority need to be reconsidered. 
I. THE THEORETICAL BACKGROUND OF BAILOUTS 
As the lender of last resort, a central bank must respond to a financial 
crisis effectively and appropriately.26 An effective response demands that 
central banks mitigate the market panic as early as possible, limiting the 
detrimental impact to a controllable stage. 27  However, this requires 
central banks to act only within an appropriate scope in order to prevent 
“distortionary effects of government intervention in private financial 
markets.”28 In guiding central banks’ response, economists have adopted 
Bagehot’s dictum set forth in Lombard Street, which can be summarized 
as: “lend early and freely . . . , to solvent firms, against good collateral, 
and at ‘high rates.’”29 
This concise dictum incorporates well-founded reasoning at both the 
macroeconomic and microeconomic level.30 At the macroeconomic level, 
“lending freely” dictates that the central banks supply adequate liquidity 
to financial institutions in order to sustain normal market activity. 31 
During the financial crisis, market panic leads to the stagnancy of all 
financial activities.32 Such stagnancy causes previously liquid financial 
products to become suddenly illiquid, driving the demand for liquidity 
even higher.33 In that situation, desperate institutions are forced to engage 
																																																																																																																																
 26. See generally Stanley Fischer, Vice Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. 
Reserve Sys., Remarks at a Conference Sponsored by the Committee on Capital Markets 
Regulation: The Lender of Last Resort: An International Perspective (Feb. 16, 2016), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/fischer20160210a.pdf [https://perm 
a.cc/N5TH-24FD] (stating that the basic function of the lender of last resort during the 
crisis is to deal with the breakdown of the functioning of the monetary and credit system, 
therefore limiting the damage caused by the crisis). 
 27. See Madigan, supra note 6. 
 28. See id. 
 29. See id. (citation omitted). 
 30. See generally id. (reasoning the rationale underlying Bagehot’s dictum from both 
the macroeconomic and microeconomic perspectives). 
 31. See id. (explaining that providing sufficient liquidity to desperate institutions 
would prevent the fire sales that usually lead to reduction of assets in those institutions). 
 32. See id. 
 33. See id. 
2017]     THE COSTS OF BAILOUTS IN THE 425 
                                     2007-08 FINANCIAL CRISIS 
in fire sales, in which their assets’ prices significantly drop.34 Decreased 
asset prices lead to a reduction in assets as well as credit borrowing, which 
shrinks economic activity.35 As a result, supplying adequate liquidity can 
help institutions avoid fire sales, thereby maintaining market activity at a 
normal level. 36  At the microeconomic level, the dictum ensures that 
liquidity is divided efficiently: lending secured by good collateral reduces 
central banks’ risk of losses, and charging a high interest rate eliminates 
firms’ reliance on central banks once liquidity is available in the private 
market.37 Rather than specifying the types of entities that the central bank 
shall lend to, Bagehot vaguely defines the potential recipients as “this man 
and that man, whenever the security is good.”38 The vague definition of 
the funds’ recipients indicates that Bagehot has foreseen the necessity of 
lending to an expansive scope of entities,39 as well as the necessity of 
central bank’s free exercise of its lending authority.40 
In addition to the aforementioned guiding principle, the creation of 
bailouts always requires legitimate authorization. Through a number of 
statutes, Congress has delegated its bailout authority to specific entities 
that act as lenders of last resort (“LOLR”), including the Fed, the 
Treasury, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”).41 
Generally, the Fed’s lending authority includes the standard discount 
window lending authority granted under Section 10B of the Act,42 the 
authority of open market operations granted under Section 14 of the Act,43 
as well as the emergency lending authority granted under Section 13(3) 
of the Act.44 Before Dodd-Frank, Section 13(3) allowed the Fed to lend 
																																																																																																																																
 34. See id. 
 35. See id. 
 36. See id. 
 37. See id. 
 38. See Bagehot, LOMBARD STREET, supra note 6, at 51. 
 39. See Madigan, supra note 6, at 1 (arguing that Bagehot does not limit the fund 
recipients to specific types of entities). 
 40. See id. (“[T]he absence of a routine reason for lending to nonbank institutions 
does not mean that central banks never need the authority to lend to such entities.”). 
 41. See Casey & Posner, supra note 7, at 494 (explaining that Congress has 
delegated its bailout authority to other institutions in a number of statutes, for instance, 
the Fed and the FDIC); Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEOR. L.J. 435, 491-
92 (2011) (explaining the historical bailout mechanism in which the Treasury and the Fed 
have adopted the role of LOLR). 
 42. 12 U.S.C. § 347b (2012). 
 43. Id. § 353. 
 44. Id. § 343(3B). 
426 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
to individuals or corporate entities in “unusual and exigent circumstances 
. . . to provide liquidity in times of financial stress.”45 In fact, many of the 
2007-08 bailout programs, including the Term Securities Lending Facility 
(“TSLF”), 46  the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (“PDCF”), 47  the 
Commercial Paper Funding Facility (“CPFF”),48 Bear Stearns,49 AIG,50 
the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (“TALF”),51  and the 
Agency MBS Facility were created by the Fed by invoking its authority 
of emergency lending.52 Different from the Fed’s lending authority, the 
FDIC’s bailout power embodies its ability to guarantee institutions’ debt 
pursuant to the “systemic risk exception.”53 The Treasury, by contrast, 
can only exercise bailout authority with the consent of Congress.54 For 
instance, when Congress authorized the Treasury to administer the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”), it limited the Treasury’s use 
of the funds solely to “purchase, and to make and fund commitments to 
purchase, troubled assets from any financial institution.” 55 
 The purpose of a bailout program is to provide temporary liquidity 
to maintain normal financial activities. 56  In reaction to the 2007-08 
financial crisis, the federal government implemented a series of bailout 
programs.57 These programs penetrated different aspects of the financial 
market, injecting liquidity through various ways. 
																																																																																																																																
 45. Extensions of Credit by Federal Reserve Banks, 80 Fed. Reg. 78,959 (Dec. 18, 
2015). 
 46. Infra Section II.A.5. 
 47. Infra Section II.A.6 
 48. Infra Section II.D.3. 
 49. Infra Section II.B.1. 
 50. Infra Sections II.C.2 to II.C.4. 
 51. Infra Section II.D.1.c. 
 52. Infra Section II.D.4. 
 53. See Martin J. Gruenberg, Vice Chairman of the International Association of 
Deposit Insurers, FDIC at the Symposium on Deposit Insurance Cross Border Issues, The 
FDIC’s Approach to Large Bank Resolution Implementation Issues (May 3, 2007), 
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/archives/2007/chairman/spmay0307.html 
(explaining that the “systemic risk exception” refers to the FDIC’s authority to bypass 
the least cost test in certain extraordinary circumstances); Casey & Posner, supra note 7, 
at 494 (explaining that the FDIC possesses “a traditional power to make bailouts by 
rescuing banks that pose a systemic threat . . . [by] pay[ing] all of the bank’s creditors”); 
see also 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G) (2012). 
 54. See Levitin, supra note 41, at 493. 
 55. 12 U.S.C. § 5211(a)(1) (2012). 
 56. See Squire, supra note 18. 
 57. See The Federal Bailout, supra note 1. 
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II. THE COSTS OF EACH BAILOUT PROGRAM 
The bailout programs can be divided into five types: 1) General Aid 
to Financial Institutions, 2) Deal Facilitation, 3) One-off Bailouts to 
Financial Institutions, 4) General Market Support, and 5) Auto Industry 
Bailouts. 58  Each type functioned to solve particular problems in the 
financial markets, with the ultimate goal of providing liquidity. 
A. GENERAL AID TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
This type of bailout aimed to provide liquidity to financial 
institutions directly. Depending on the different needs of financial 
institutions, the supply of liquidity was designed to occur in various 
formats: short-term Fed loans,59 currency swaps,60 repo contracts,61 liquid 
securities,62 guarantees,63 as well as equity acquisitions.64 
1. Primary Credit Program: Modified Discount Window 
As the first response to the financial crisis, the Primary Credit 
Program aimed to incentivize banks’ access to short term liquidity by 
modifying the rate and terms of the then-existing discount window.65 
From August 2007 to March 2008, the Fed extended the term of the loan 
from one day to ninety days and reduced the primary credit rate from one 
																																																																																																																																
 58. For an alternative way of categorizing the bailout programs, see Felkerson, supra 
note 24. That paper categorized bailout programs by different stages during which certain 
programs were created. For instance, stage one has been categorized as the “short-term 
liquidity provision,” stage two as “restart the flow of credit by direct purchases of assets,” 
etc. Id. at 8, 21. 
 59. See Primary Credit Program, infra Section II.A.1; Term Auction Facility, infra 
Section II.A.2. 
 60. See Central Bank Liquidity Swap, infra Section II.A.3. 
 61. See Single-Tranche Term Repurchase Agreement, infra Section II.A.4; Primary 
Dealer Credit Facility, infra Section II.A.6. 
 62. See Term Securities Lending Facility, infra Section II.A.5. 
 63. See Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program, infra Section II.A.7. 
 64. See Bank Investment Programs under TARP, infra Section II.A.8. 
 65. Primary Credit Program (the “Discount Program Modification”)(Fed), 
SOURCEWATCH, http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/Primary_Credit_Program_ 
(the_%22Discount_Program_Modification%22)_(Fed) [https://perma.cc/GM7J-KJA5] 
(last modified July 14, 2011). 
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percentage point over the target federal funds rate66 to twenty-five basis 
points.67 On October 29, 2008, the peak outstanding loans amounted to 
$112 billion.68 On December 29, 2010, the amount of the outstanding 
loans returned to their normal levels, as before the crisis.69 
In assessing the net return of the Primary Credit Program, it is 
necessary to examine both the total dollar amount of gain or loss and 
whether a gain is above or below the market rate at the time the fund was 
provided. 70  Because the Fed Fund rate has usually been used as the 
benchmark for setting any short-term loan rates, the Fed Fund rate will be 
used as the comparable market rate in analyzing the investment returns.71 
Because all primary loans have been paid back, the generated interest 
represents net gain. For a daily assessment, the minimum amount of gain 
can be calculated by multiplying the primary credit amount with the 
primary rate, and then dividing the product by 365 days.72 Each loan rate 
is compared with the Fed Fund Rate set at that time. Spreadsheet 1 shows 
an excerpt of transaction data of the Primary Credit Program, together 
with its comparable Fed Fund rate.73 As shown, each loan was made at an 
interest rate that was higher than its correlated Fed Fund rate.74 Based on 
the available data of the primary credit amounts and the primary rates, the 
																																																																																																																																
 66. The target federal fund rate is defined as “[t]he interest rate charged by one 
depository institution on an overnight sale of balances at the Federal Reserve to another 
depository institution, as determined by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of 
the Federal Reserve.” Target Rate, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t 
/target-rate.asp [https://perma.cc/KRN5-GJR3]. 
 67. See Primary Credit Program (the “Discount Program Modification”)(Fed), 
supra note 65. 
 68. Reserve Bank Credit: Loans to Depository Institutions: Primary Credit (WPC), 
FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS: FED RESERVE ECON. DATA, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/ 
series/WPC [https://perma.cc/659J-9FHZ] (last updated Mar. 16, 2017). 
 69. See id. 
 70. See supra Introduction. 
 71. See Federal Funds Rate, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/ 
federalfundsrate.asp [https://perma.cc/7YMQ-9SL3] (“[T]he Federal Funds Rate can be 
viewed as the base rate that determines the level of all other interest rates in the U.S. 
economy.”). 
 72. The Fed’s published reporting only covers periods starting on July 22, 2010. For 
the period between August 17, 2007 and December 29, 2010, it is unknown for exactly 
how many days each loan was lent. In the calculation it is supposed that each loan was 
only lent out for one day; therefore the gain from each loan represents the minimum 
amount of return that loan could have generated. 
 73. Infra Appendix 1. 
 74. See infra Appendix 1. 
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total amount calculated reflects a minimum positive return from this 
program, equaling $978 million. 
Observing 
Date 
Primary 
Credit 
(millions 
of dollars) 
Primary 
rate (%) 
Gain/Loss  
(in dollars) 
Fed Fund 
Rate Dates 
Fed 
Fund 
Rate 
(%) 
08-15-2007 11.00 5.75 1,732.88 08-01-2007 5.02 
08-22-2007 1,200.00 5.75 189,041.10 08-01-2007 5.02 
08-29-2007 1,315.00 5.75 207,157.53 08-01-2007 5.02 
09-05-2007 1,103.00 5.75 173,760.27 09-01-2007 4.94 
09-12-2007 2,932.00 5.75 461,890.41 09-01-2007 4.94 
09-19-2007 2,179.00 5.25 313,417.81 09-01-2007 4.94 
12-15-2010 22.00 0.75 452.05 12-01-2010 0.18 
12-22-2010 28.00 0.75 575.34 12-01-2010 0.18 
12-29-2010 52.00 0.75 1,068.49 12-01-2010 0.18 
Sum      978,068,08.00 
Spreadsheet 1: Excerpt of Primary Credits with Fed Fund Rate Comparison75 
2. The Term Auction Facility 
Despite the attractive rates and terms of the Modified Discount 
Window, the Primary Credit Program fell short of its expected success 
due to the reputational effects of discount borrowing (“DW stigma”).76 
The DW stigma refers to banks’ reluctance to borrow from the discount 
window, fearing that such borrowing will be considered an indication of 
their financial weakness. 77  Because the DW stigma usually escalates 
																																																																																																																																
 75. Effective Federal Funds Rate, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS: FED RESERVE 
ECON. DATA, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS [https://perma.cc/VU3K-
U3TE]; Historical Discount Rates, FED. RESERVE DISCOUNT WINDOW, https://www.frbdi 
scountwindow.org/en/Pages/Discount-Rates/Historical-Discount-Rates.aspx [https://per 
ma.cc/978Y-PY9A] (last updated Mar. 1, 2017). 
 76. Term Auction Facility (TAF), BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/regreform/reform-taf.htm [https://perma.cc/V3SH-G3V 
E] (“[M]any banks were reluctant to borrow at the discount window out of fear that their 
borrowing would become known and would be erroneously taken as a sign of financial 
weakness.”) 
 77. See OLIVIER ARMANTIER, ERIC GHYSELS, ASANI SARKAR & JEFFREY SHRADER, 
FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., DISCOUNT WINDOW STIGMA DURING THE 2007-2008 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 1 (2015), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/st 
aff_reports/sr483.pdf [https://perma.cc/6T7Y-988C]. 
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during a financial crisis,78 the need for a program that distributes liquidity 
without causing borrowers concern about the DW stigma becomes urgent. 
In light of this urgent need, the Fed created the Term Auction Facility 
(“TAF”) program in December 2007. 79  Different from traditional 
discount window borrowing, TAF took the format of auctions in which 
banks submitted bids stating the amount of liquidity they needed and the 
interest rate they were willing to pay.80 This innovative auction format 
enabled TAF to achieve an “immediate success” in terms of the 
distribution of liquidity.81 From December 20, 2007 to March 11, 2010, 
TAF provided a total of $3818 billion in loans, with the peak amount 
outstanding at $493 billion on March 9, 2009.82 The Fed created the TAF 
based on its standard discount window lending authority.83 According to 
the Fed, all TAF loans were repaid in their entirety, along with interest.84 
The complete data of TAF transactions is available on the Federal 
Reserve website.85 With the data provided, the gain from TAF can be 
calculated by using parameters of the loan date, maturity date, term, loan 
amount, and the interest rate.86 The gain of each loan is calculated by 
multiplying the loan amount, interest rate, and term, then dividing that 
product by 365 days.87 After adding up the gains from each loan, the total 
gain from TAF is $4.149 billion. 
 
																																																																																																																																
 78. See id. (“[T]he economic consequences of DW stigma may be most severe 
during financial crises when market participants have strong incentives to identify the 
weakest financial firms.”) 
 79. See id. at 3 (explaining that the main purpose of TAF was to overcome the DW 
stigma); Term Auction Facility (TAF), supra note 76. 
 80. See Term Auction Facility, supra note 76. 
 81. ARMANTIER, GHYSELS, SARKAR & SHRADER, supra note 77, at 3, 47 (explaining 
that the TAF achieved an “immediate success in terms of amount borrowed,” given that 
the submitted bids have been consistently higher than the funds actually allocated under 
TAF, and that the DW funds have rarely been used since the creation of TAF). 
 82. See Term Auction Facility (TAF), supra note 76. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See id. 
 87. The interest rate is the yearly rate. The gain of each loan is measured by how 
many days each loan was lent out. Dividing the product of (loan amount*interest rate) by 
365 we get the daily gain of each loan; by multiplying the result by the term, we get the 
amount that the loan transaction was able to make. 
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Loan date 
Maturity 
date 
Term 
(in 
days) Borrower 
Loan 
amount 
(millions 
of 
dollars) 
Interest 
rate 
(%) 
12-20-2007 01-17-2008 28 Citibank NA 10.0 4.650 
12-20-2007 01-17-2008 28 
Norinchukin BK NY 
BR 10.0 4.650 
12-20-2007 01-17-2008 28 
Bank of nova scotia 
NY AGY 14.7 4.650 
12-20-2007 01-17-2008 28 
Landesbank hessen-
thurin NY BR 1,900.0 4.650 
12-20-2007 01-17-2008 28 
Lloyds TSB BK PLC 
NY BR 205.9 4.650 
12-20-2007 01-17-2008 28 Westlb AG NY BR 2,000.0 4.650 
12-20-2007 01-17-2008 28 
Toronto-dominion 
BK NY BR 250.0 4.650 
12-20-2007 01-17-2008 28 
Bayerische 
landesbank NY BR 1,000.0 4.650 
12-20-2007 01-17-2008 28 
Westpac BKG CORP 
NY BR 90.0 4.650 
12-20-2007 01-17-2008 28 
Arab BKG CORP 
NY BR 200.0 4.650 
12-20-2007 01-17-2008 28 
Societe generale NY 
BR 39.2 4.650 
Spreadsheet 2: Excerpt of Term Auction Facility Data 
After examining the total gain from TAF, the interest rate of each 
loan must be compared with its correlated market rate, i.e., the Fed Fund 
rate. A complete data comparison of those two sets of rates reveals that 
each loan of the TAF program was charged at a higher rate than its 
correlated Fed Fund rate. Spreadsheet 3 shows a list of selected dates on 
which a TAF loan was made, together with two sets of comparisons. One 
compares the loan interest rate with the Fed Fund rate charged on that 
date; the other compares the gain under TAF with a hypothetical gain 
charged by the Fed Fund rate. As shown, if marked at the Fed Fund rate, 
the Fed would only make a gain of $3.423 billion, while the total profit 
from TAF was $4.149 billion. Therefore, by lending through the TAF 
program, the Fed made $0.726 billion over the risk-free rate. 
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Spreadsheet 3: Comparison Between Loan Interest Rate and Fed Fund 
Rate 
3. Central Bank Liquidity Swap 
Through providing short-term liquidity in U.S. dollars to foreign 
central banks, the Central Bank Liquidity Swap (“CBLS”) functioned to 
stabilize the currency exchange rate between the U.S. dollar and other 
major foreign currencies. 88  While the CBLS consisted of the Dollar 
Liquidity Swap Lines and the Foreign Currency Liquidity Swap Lines, 
only the former was used during the 2008 bailout.89 Under the Dollar 
Liquidity Swap Lines, foreign central banks sell and later buy back their 
currency for dollar in the same exchange rate, and pay interest on the 
equivalent dollar amount they borrowed from such sell-and-buy-back 
transactions.90 The Fed’s authority for operating CBLS was granted by 
Section 14 of the Act.91  Fortunately, the Fed has made the complete 
transaction data of this program available, based on which the gain may 
																																																																																																																																
 88. See Central Bank Liquidity Swaps, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE 
SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_liquidityswaps.htm [https://pe 
rma.cc/UVN8-UQ2W] (last updated Feb. 16, 2017). 
 89. See id. (explaining that the Fed has not drawn on any of the Foreign-Currency 
Liquidity Swap Lines since their establishment in 2009, despite announced 
arrangements). 
 90. See id. 
 91. See id. 
Term 
Auction 
Facility 
Data       
Sum Gain 
(millions of 
dollars)     
Sum Gain 
Fed Fund 
(millions of 
dollars)  
        4149.769849     3243.826702 
Loan 
date 
Term 
(days) 
Loan 
amount 
(millions 
of 
dollars) 
Interest 
(%) 
Gain 
(millions of 
dollars) 
Fed 
Fund 
Rate 
Date 
Fed 
Fund 
Rate 
(%) 
Gain if Fed 
Fund 
(millions of 
dollars) 
12-20-07 28 10.0 4.650 0.035671233 12-01-07 4.240 0.032526027 
03-13-08 28 11.0 2.800 0.023627397 03-01-08 2.610 0.02202411 
03-27-08 28 1,000.0 2.615 2.006027397 03-01-08 2.610 2.002191781 
03-27-08 28 20.0 2.615 0.040120548 03-01-08 2.610 0.040043836 
04-10-08 28 3,400.0 2.820 7.355178082 04-01-08 2.280 5.946739726 
04-10-08 28 15.0 2.820 0.032449315 04-01-08 2.280 0.026235616 
04-24-08 28 500.0 2.870 1.100821918 04-01-08 2.280 0.874520548 
04-24-08 28 50.0 2.870 0.110082192 04-01-08 2.280 0.087452055 
05-08-08 28 30.0 2.220 0.051090411 05-01-08 1.980 0.045567123 
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be calculated.92 In calculating the gain of the Dollar Liquidity Swap Lines, 
the relevant parameters are the amount extended, interest rate, as well as 
the tenor of transaction.93 The exchange rate of currency is not relevant 
since the foreign central bank sells and buys back the same amount of 
foreign currency at the same exchange rate. The gain of each transaction 
can be calculated by multiplying the amount extended, interest rate, and 
the tenor, then dividing by 365. After adding up the gain of each 
transaction, the total gain is approximately $5.747 billion. 
Central bank 
counterparty 
Tenor 
(days) 
Trade 
date 
Maturity 
date 
Amount 
extended 
(millions 
of dollars) 
 Interest 
rate (%) 
European Central 
Bank 28 12-17-07 01-17-08  10,000.0   4.65  
Swiss National 
Bank 28 12-17-07 01-17-08  4,000.0   4.79  
European Central 
Bank 35 12-21-07 01-31-08  10,000.0   4.67  
European Central 
Bank 28 01-14-08 02-14-08  10,000.0   3.95  
Swiss National 
Bank 28 01-14-08 02-14-08  4,000.0   3.91  
European Central 
Bank 28 01-14-08 02-14-08  10,000.0   3.12  
European Central 
Bank 28 03-25-08 04-24-08  15,000.0   2.61  
Spreadsheet 4: Excerpt of Central Bank Liquidity Swap Data 
4. Single-Tranche Term Repurchase Agreement 
With the explicit purpose of providing direct liquidity to primary 
dealers, the Fed announced the Single-Tranche Term Repurchase 
Agreement (“ST OMO”) in March 2008.94 The ST OMO transactions 
were twenty-eight day repurchase contracts in which primary dealers 
																																																																																																																																
 92. See Central Bank Liquidity Swap Lines, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. 
RESERVE SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/regreform/reform-swaplines.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/NQM9-LBU5] (last updated Feb. 12, 2016). 
 93. Tenor represents the number of days from the settlement date to the maturity 
date. 
 94. See Single-Tranche Term Repurchase Agreements, March–December 2008, BD. 
OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetar 
ypolicy/bst_tranche.htm [https://perma.cc/KF2Y-2R7E ] (last updated Feb. 16, 2017). 
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were required to post collaterals of certain types, such as treasuries, 
agency debt or agency MBS, for the ST OMO repo contracts.95 
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York (“FRBNY”) conducted 
these transactions “under the standard legal authority for conducting 
temporary open market operations.” 96  The amount lent reached $80 
billion at its highest on April 30, 2008.97 This program ended at the end 
of December 2008,98 with all loans repaid in their entirety with interest.99 
Since the complete transaction data is available, the gain can be calculated 
from each transaction by multiplying the trade amount, rate, and term of 
trade (twenty-eight days), and then dividing that product by 365. Pursuant 
to this calculation, the total gain of all 375 transactions is approximately 
$1.259 billion. 
Trade date  
Settlement 
date 
Repurchase 
date 
Term of 
trade (in 
days) 
Trade 
amount 
(millions 
of 
dollars) Rate (%) 
03-07-08 03-10-08 04-07-08 28 2,000.0 2.78 
03-07-08 03-10-08 04-07-08 28 5,000.0 2.85 
03-07-08 03-10-08 04-07-08 28 1,000.0 2.75 
03-07-08 03-10-08 04-07-08 28 5,000.0 2.82 
03-07-08 03-10-08 04-07-08 28 1,000.0 3.05 
03-07-08 03-10-08 04-07-08 28 1,000.0 2.90 
03-11-08 03-12-08 04-09-08 28 610.0 2.60 
03-11-08 03-12-08 04-09-08 28 500.0 2.65 
03-11-08 03-12-08 04-09-08 28 305.0 2.60 
03-11-08 03-12-08 04-09-08 28 1,000.0 2.65 
																																																																																																																																
 95. See Press Release—Federal Reserve Announces Two Initiatives to Address 
Heightened Liquidity Pressures in Term Funding Markets, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE 
FED. RESERVE SYS. (Mar. 7, 2008), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/m 
onetary/20080307a.htm [https://perma.cc/97HN-YL6C]. 
 96. Single-Tranche Term Repurchase Agreements, March–December 2008, supra 
note 94. 
 97. See Fast Facts, Single-Tranche Term Repurchase Agreements, FED. RESERVE 
BANK OF N.Y., https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/fast_facts.html [https://perma.cc/H 
AG2-UCEL]. 
 98. See id. (“[T]he last auction was conducted in December 2008 and started winding 
down the first week of January 2009.”). 
 99. See Single-Tranche Repurchase Agreements, SOURCEWATCH.ORG., http://www. 
sourcewatch.org/index.php/Single-Tranche_Repurchase_Agreements. Because the 
current amount outstanding is zero, all loans have been repaid in full. 
2017]     THE COSTS OF BAILOUTS IN THE 435 
                                     2007-08 FINANCIAL CRISIS 
03-11-08 03-12-08 04-09-08 28 100.0 2.63 
03-11-08 03-12-08 04-09-08 28 5,000.0 2.68 
03-11-08 03-12-08 04-09-08 28 1,500.0 2.70 
Spreadsheet 5: Excerpt of Single Tranche Term Repurchase Data100 
5. Term Securities Lending Facility 
Compared to ST OMO, which provided primary dealers with cash 
liquidity, the TSLF program provided liquidity in the form of liquid 
securities. 101  This program allowed primary dealers to borrow 
comparatively liquid treasury securities from the Fed by paying a fee and 
posting collateral consisting of temporarily illiquid securities.102 Similar 
to TAF, the TSLF fund utilized an auction mechanism,103 minimizing the 
stigma problem. TSLF allowed the Fed to effectively absorb the 
temporarily illiquid securities, which had been one of the causes of the 
2008 financial crisis.104 This program, created under the Fed’s authority 
under Section 13(3) of the Act,105 was introduced in March 2008 and 
ended in February 2010, with all loans being repaid in their entirety, along 
with interest.106 
With the available, complete transaction data, the gain was 
calculated by using the loan date, maturity date, lending fee, and the par 
amount of the loan.107 The lending fee is first divided by 100 to represent 
its percentage value, then by 365 to represent the annual interest rate. 
Much like the previous calculations, the gain of a single loan transaction 
can be calculated by multiplying the number of days, par amount lent, and 
the lending fee, then first dividing the product by 365, and finally dividing 
																																																																																																																																
 100. See Single-Tranche Term Repurchase Agreements, March–December 2008, 
supra note 94. 
 101. See Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) and TSLF Options Program (TOP), 
BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/newseve 
nts/reform_tslf.htm [https://perma.cc/3WJG-WXT7] (last updated Feb. 12, 2016). 
 102. See id. 
 103. See id. 
 104. See id. 
 105. See Section 13. Powers of Federal Reserve Banks, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE 
FED. RESERVE SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/section13.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/CSF9-2AST] (last updated Feb. 13, 2017). 
 106. See Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) and TSLF Options Program (TOP), 
supra note 101. 
 107. See id. 
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the quotient by 100. As calculated, the total gain of the TSLF program is 
approximately $699.158 million. 
Trade 
date 
Loan 
date 
Maturity 
date Borrower 
Lending 
fee (%) 
Par 
amount 
lent 
(millions 
of dollars) 
03-27-08 03-28-08 04-25-08 J.P. Morgan Securities LLC 0.33 3,000.00 
03-27-08 03-28-08 04-25-08 Barclays Capital Inc. 0.33 500 
03-27-08 03-28-08 04-25-08 UBS Securities LLC. 0.33 15,000.00 
03-27-08 03-28-08 04-25-08 Citigroup Global Markets Inc. 0.33 1,000.00 
03-27-08 03-28-08 04-25-08 BNP Paribas Securities Corp. 0.33 1,500.00 
03-27-08 03-28-08 04-25-08 
Morgan Stanley & Co. 
Incorporated 0.33 5,000.00 
03-27-08 03-28-08 04-25-08 Lehman Brothers Inc. 0.33 8,000.00 
03-27-08 03-28-08 04-25-08 RBS Securities Inc. 0.33 4,000.00 
03-27-08 03-28-08 04-25-08 Goldman, Sachs & Co. 0.33 7,000.00 
03-27-08 03-28-08 04-25-08 Deutsche Bank Securities Inc. 0.33 6,000.00 
03-27-08 03-28-08 04-25-08 
Countrywide Securities 
Corporation 0.33 1,000.00 
03-27-08 03-28-08 04-25-08 
Credit Suisse Securities (USA) 
LLC 0.33 5,000.00 
03-27-08 03-28-08 04-25-08 
Banc of America Securities 
LLC 0.33 7,000.00 
03-27-08 03-28-08 04-25-08 Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc. 0.33 1,000.00 
03-27-08 03-28-08 04-25-08 
Merrill Lynch Government 
Securities Inc. 0.33 10,000.00 
04-03-08 04-04-08 05-02-08 
Morgan Stanley & Co. 
Incorporated 0.16 2,000.00 
04-03-08 04-04-08 05-02-08 
Merrill Lynch Government 
Securities Inc. 0.16 4,000.00 
04-03-08 04-04-08 05-02-08 BNP Paribas Securities Corp. 0.16 5,000.00 
04-03-08 04-04-08 05-02-08 Deutsche Bank Securities Inc. 0.16 5,000.00 
04-03-08 04-04-08 05-02-08 Barclays Capital Inc. 0.16 400 
04-03-08 04-04-08 05-02-08 
Countrywide Securities 
Corporation 0.16 1,000.00 
04-03-08 04-04-08 05-02-08 Citigroup Global Markets Inc. 0.16 4,600.00 
04-03-08 04-04-08 05-02-08 J.P. Morgan Securities LLC 0.16 3,000.00 
04-10-08 04-11-08 05-09-08 Deutsche Bank Securities Inc. 0.25 2,500.00 
Spreadsheet 6: Excerpt of Term Securities Lending Facility Data108 
																																																																																																																																
 108. See id. 
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6. Primary Dealer Credit Facility 
The PDCF can be characterized as a repo with a lowered standard.109 
Unlike a standard repo that requires treasury collateral, the PDCF 
program allowed primary dealers to post investment-grade securities (or, 
later, an even wider range of securities) as collateral in order to borrow 
money on an overnight basis.110 PDCF was introduced in March 2008, 
and was created under Section 13(3) of the Act.111 The program ended 
successfully on February 1, 2010, with all loans repaid in their entirety 
and with interest.112 
With the data provided by the Fed,113 the gain was calculated by 
using two parameters: the loan amount and the interest rate. Since each 
loan was borrowed for only one day, the daily amount of return can be 
calculated by multiplying the loan amount and the interest rate. Since the 
interest rate is provided as an annual rate, the resulting product should be 
divided by 365. In sum, the total gain from the PDCF is approximately 
$375.807 million. 
Date  Borrower 
Loan 
Amount 
(millions 
of dollars) 
Interest 
Rate (%) 
03-17-08 Barclays Capital Inc. 2,000.0 3.25 
03-17-08 Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc. 28,000.0 3.25 
03-17-08 Countrywide Securities Corporation 1,525.0 3.25 
03-17-08 Deutsche Bank Securities Inc. 500.0 3.25 
03-17-08 Morgan Stanley & Co. Incorporated 2,000.0 3.25 
03-17-08 BNP Paribas Securities Corp. 500.0 3.25 
03-18-08 Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc. 27,500.0 2.50 
03-18-08 Citigroup Global Markets Inc. 500.0 2.50 
03-18-08 Countrywide Securities Corporation 1,000.0 2.50 
																																																																																																																																
 109. “A repurchase agreement (repo) is a form of short-term borrowing for dealers in 
government securities. The dealer sells the government securities to investors, usually on 
an overnight basis, and buys them back the following day.” Repurchase Agreement –
Repo, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/repurchaseagreement.asp 
[https://perma.cc/4WL9-M4Z4]. 
 110. See Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF), BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. 
RESERVE SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_pdcf.htm [https://per 
ma.cc/2Y95-Y55H ] (last updated Feb. 12, 2016). 
 111. See id. 
 112. See id. 
 113. See id. 
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03-18-08 Goldman, Sachs & Co. 100.0 2.50 
03-18-08 Lehman Brothers Inc. 1,606.0 2.50 
03-18-08 Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc. 25,000.0 2.50 
03-18-08 Citigroup Global Markets Inc. 500.0 2.50 
03-19-08 Countrywide Securities Corporation 1,000.0 2.50 
03-19-08 Lehman Brothers Inc. 2,300.0 2.50 
03-20-08 Barclays Capital Inc. 1,000.0 2.50 
03-20-08 Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc. 25,500.0 2.50 
03-20-08 Citigroup Global Markets Inc. 1,500.0 2.50 
Spreadsheet 7: Primary Dealer Credit Facility Data Excerpt 
7. Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program 
Through providing governmental guarantees to depository banks, the 
Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (“TLGP”) functioned to 
mitigate the deposit accounts’ loss. 114  Announced by the FDIC on 
October 14, 2008, the TLGP consisted of two parts: the Transaction 
Account Guarantee Program (“TAGP”) and the Debt Guarantee Program 
(“DGP”). 115  The TAGP guaranteed noninterest-bearing accounts of 
depository banks.116 The DGP guaranteed senior unsecured debt issued 
by depository banks or bank holding companies.117 By providing these 
governmental guarantees, this program restored stability in the financial 
market and rebuilt customers’ faith in financial products.118 According to 
the FDIC, the TLGP produced a net profit of $9.3 billion from the 
collected fees in excess of the paid losses.119 Through the TAGP, the 
FDIC collected $1.2 billion for fees, and the estimated total losses were 
$2.1 billion; in the DGP, the FDIC collected $10.4 billion in fees and paid 
$153 million in losses.120 
																																																																																																																																
 114. See Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program, FDIC, https://www.fdic.gov/regu 
lations/resources/tlgp/ [https://perma.cc/W9JK-E866] (last updated Feb. 27, 2013). 
 115. See id. 
 116. See id. 
 117. See id. 
 118. See Walker, supra note 17, at 687-88. 
 119. See Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program, supra note 114. 
 120. See id. 
2017]     THE COSTS OF BAILOUTS IN THE 439 
                                     2007-08 FINANCIAL CRISIS 
8. The Bank Investment Programs Under TARP 
Unlike other facilities that provided liquidity in exchange for 
collateral, TARP’s Bank Investment Programs provided liquidity in 
exchange for equity (preferred stock) in financial institutions.121 The U.S. 
Treasury invested approximately $245 billion across five distinct bank 
programs, the biggest of which were the Asset Guarantee Program 
(“AGP”), the Capital Purchase Program (“CPP”), and the Targeted 
Investment Program (“TIP”). 122  Pursuant to data provided by the 
Treasury, as of October 2016, the Treasury made a $30.1 billion profit in 
addition to the full recovery of its original investment.123 
a. Asset Guarantee Program 
Conducted jointly by the Treasury, Fed, and the FDIC, the AGP 
intended to rescue institutions whose failure would severely impact the 
financial system at large.124 Pursuant to the AGP agreement, the AGP 
would share a portion of these institutions’ asset losses in exchange for 
warrants and dividend-paying preferred stock.125 Participating institutions 
that wanted to terminate early were charged a termination fee.126 Two 
financial institutions participated in the AGP: Bank of America and 
Citigroup. 127  According to the Treasury, Bank of America ended up 
terminating negotiations before the finalization of the agreement, paying 
a termination fee of $425 million.128 Since none of the TARP funds were 
spent, this termination fee was a pure gain for the program.129 
																																																																																																																																
 121. See Bank Investment Programs, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://www.trea 
sury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/bank-investment-programs/Page 
s/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/7UB9-ENEJ] (last updated Nov. 15, 2016). The core part 
of these programs was to fund these institutions through buying their preferred stock. See 
infra Sections II.A.8.a, II.A.8.b and II.A.8.c. 
 122. See Bank Investment Programs, supra note 121. 
 123. See id. 
 124. See Asset Guarantee Program, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/bank-investme 
nt-programs/agp/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/7ENF-JJLY] (last updated Dec. 9, 
2013). 
 125. See id. 
 126. See id. 
 127. See id. 
 128. See id. 
 129. See id. 
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In January 2009, under the AGP the government agreed to share 
losses on Citigroup’s $301 billion assets in exchange for $7.1 billion 
worth of Citigroup’s preferred stock.130 This guarantee was terminated in 
December 2009, which resulted in the Treasury and FDIC keeping $5.3 
billion of the preferred stock that was ultimately sold for $2.76 billion.131 
The $2.76 billion represented a net gain, since Citigroup did not claim any 
loss.132 The AGP overall led to a total gain of $3 billion.133 
b. Capital Purchase Program 
The CPP was established to provide direct capital to financial 
institutions in exchange for preferred stock or debt securities.134 This was 
the largest initiative under TARP and by the end of the investment period, 
the Treasury’s total investment amounted to $204.9 billion.135 Under this 
program, 707 financial institutions received capital, averaging $301.3 
million per institution.136 
The preferred stock that the Treasury received under this program 
generated a 5% dividend for the first five years and a 9% dividend 
afterwards. 137  The Treasury had received $226.7 billion from this 
program as of October 31, 2016.138 As of September 30, 2016, the CPP 
had generated another $12 billion from dividends and interest.139 As a 
																																																																																																																																
 130. See id. 
 131. See id. 
 132. See id. 
 133. See id. 
 134. See Capital Purchase Program: Program Purpose & Overview, U.S. DEP’T OF 
THE TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs 
/bank-investment-programs/cap/Pages/overview.aspx [https://perma.cc/S3E2-N8C7] 
(last updated Oct. 16, 2015). 
 135. See Capital Purchase Program: Program Status, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY 
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/bank-investme 
nt-programs/cap/Pages/payments.aspx [https://perma.cc/RGK9-EM6Y] (last updated 
Nov. 16, 2016). 
 136. See id. 
 137. See Capital Purchase Program: Program Purpose & Overview, supra note 135. 
 138. See id. 
 139. See SEPTEMBER 2016 DIVIDEND AND INTEREST REPORT, U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY (2016), https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Docu 
ments/September%202016%20Dividend_Interest%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/8A7 
D-4C5Q]. 
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result, the net profit as of that date totaled $33.8 billion.140 This program 
is still open and reports its status on a monthly basis to Congress.141 
c. Targeted Investment Program 
The TIP was created to specifically assist financial institutions that 
possess important roles in the financial market.142 Under this program, the 
Treasury’s $20 billion total investment was allocated between Bank of 
America and Citigroup. 143  Similar to the conditions under CPP, the 
Treasury received preferred stock, as well as warrants to purchase 
common stock in exchange for the investment.144 The preferred stock 
received under this program generated an 8% dividend, even higher than 
the 5% dividend under the CPP.145 
According to the Treasury, the investment was fully repaid by 
December 2009, resulting in a $3 billion dividend.146 With the end of this 
program, the overall return has reached $4.4 billion.147 
B. DEAL FACILITATION 
1. Bear Stearns-JP Morgan Bridge Loan 
As one of the biggest securities firms, Bear Stearns had a large 
presence in various financial sectors, rendering it a vital player in the 
financial market.148 The turmoil of the financial markets starting in 2007 
																																																																																																																																
 140. This amount is calculated as follows: $226.7 billion - $204.9 billion + $12 billion 
= $33.8 billion. 
 141. See Monthly Report to Congress, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Pages/Monthly-Report-to 
-Congress.aspx [https://perma.cc/QZ58-D5BS]. 
 142. See Targeted Investment Program, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/bank-investme 
nt-programs/tip/Pages/overview.aspx [https://perma.cc/69R5-MEZG] (last updated Dec. 
9, 2013). 
 143. See id. 
 144. See id. 
 145. See id. 
 146. See id. 
 147. See id. 
 148. See Bear Stearns, JPMorgan Chase, and Maiden Lane LLC, BD. OF GOVERNORS 
OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_bearstea 
rns.htm [https://perma.cc/G3CK-L46B] (last updated Feb. 12, 2016). 
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caused the rapid collapse of the firm’s financial condition, bringing it to 
the brink of default in March 2008.149 To prevent potential interruption in 
the credit markets, the Fed authorized the FRBNY to lend Bear Stearns 
$12.9 billion secured by Bear Stearns’ $13.8 billion assets and charged 
with a 3.5% interest rate.150 On March 17, 2008, Bear Stearns repaid the 
loan in its entirety.151 According to the Fed’s website resource, the Fed 
made a net profit of nearly $4 million through this 3-day loan.152 
Loan date 03-14-08 
Repayment date 03-17-08 
Loan amount (billions of dollars) 12.9 
Interest rate (%) 3.50 
Total collateral (billions of dollars) 13.8 
    
Collateral by Asset Type   
Collateralized mortgage obligations (CMO) (billions 
of dollars) 5.4 
Other asset-backed securities (ABS) (billions of 
dollars)  1.6 
Municipal securities (billions of dollars) 0.7 
Other securities and equity (billions of dollars)  6.1 
Spreadsheet 8: Bridge Loan to Bear Stearns Through JPMorgan Chase Bank.153 
2. Maiden Lane LLC 
Despite receiving the loan on March 14, 2008, Bear Stearns’ 
situation worsened, prompting an acquisition for which JPMorgan Chase 
appeared to be the only viable bidder.154 In light of the pressing need of 
acquisition, Maiden Lane LLC was created to smooth the deal.155 The 
FRBNY lent $29 billion to Maiden Lane LLC to purchase Bear Stearns’ 
assets, for which the FRBNY charged a primary credit rate.156 Pursuant to 
																																																																																																																																
 149. See id. 
 150. See id. 
 151. See id. 
 152. Id. The exact amount of gain is $3,710,958.90. 
 153. See id. 
 154. See id. 
 155. See id. 
 156. See id. 
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the website resource of the FRBNY, the Fed made a gain of $765 million 
from the $29 billion loan.157 
C. ONE-OFF BAILOUTS TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
1. Fannie-Freddy Bailout 
On September 17, 2008, Congress bailed out two mortgage giants, 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which had become nearly the only sources 
of loans for American homeowners. 158  The Treasury invested $187.5 
billion in exchange for senior preferred stock that paid a 10% dividend, 
as well as common stock warrants representing a 79.9% ownership.159 
According to Bloomberg news, as of November 30, 2016, the Treasury 
had received more than $250 billion from the two firms, generating $62.5 
billion of gain for U.S. taxpayers.160 
2. AIG Revolving Credit Facility 
American International Group (“AIG”) faced significant liquidity 
problems in 2008 and was unable to obtain adequate funding from short-
term funding markets.161  If AIG had failed, the recession could have 
gotten worse.162 To avert AIG’s impending failure, the Fed established a 
revolving credit facility on September 16, 2008.163 The initial agreement 
provided AIG liquidity in the amount of $85 billion, charged by an 
																																																																																																																																
 157. See Maiden Lane Transactions, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., https://www.new 
yorkfed.org/markets/maidenlane.html [https://perma.cc/2AFK-QSPP]. 
 158. See Kimberly Amadeo, What Was the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Bailout?, 
BALANCE (Aug. 11, 2016), https://www.thebalance.com/what-was-the-fannie-mae-and-
freddie-mac-bailout-3305658 [https://perma.cc/5LG6-Z7TL]. 
 159. See Federal Takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, WIKIPEDIA.ORG, https:// 
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_takeover_of_Fannie_Mae_and_Freddie_Mac [https://per 
ma.cc/98F3-NZ8J]. 
 160. See Joe Light, Fannie and Freddie Should Exit Government Grip, Mnuchin Says, 
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-11-30/ 
fannie-and-freddie-should-exit-government-s-grip-mnuchin-says [https://perma.cc/T 
P9Z-YHR2]. 
 161. See American International Group (AIG), Maiden Lane II and III, BD. OF 
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/regreform/refo 
rm-aig.htm [https://perma.cc/F562-RSP5] (last updated Feb. 12, 2016). 
 162. See id. 
 163. See id. 
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interest rate equaling 850 basis points above the three-month LIBOR.164 
On November 10, 2007, the Fed and the Treasury restructured the AIG-
related programs, through which AIG sold preferred stock and gained 
more favorable lending terms.165 Through the restructuring, AIG sold $40 
billion in preferred stock to the Treasury and $26 billion in preferred stock 
in two of its subsidiaries to the Fed.166 Meanwhile, the interest rate on its 
line of credit, outstanding and undrawn, was reduced.167 Its overall line of 
credit, through the revolving credit facility, was also reduced to $35 
million.168 
On September 30, 2010, upon the new recapitalization agreement 
among AIG, the FRBNY, and the Treasury, the revolving credit facility 
program was terminated.169 According to the Treasury, the Fed received 
a total loan repayment of $41.8 billion, making a positive return of $6.8 
billion on its loans to AIG.170 
3. AIG Securities Borrowing Facility 
Anticipating the possible interruption of security-borrowing by 
AIG’s counterparties, in October 2008 the FRBNY was authorized to 
temporarily function as such a counterparty, and was allowed to use cash 
collateral to borrow investment-grade securities from AIG.171 After the 
																																																																																																																																
 164. See id. The LIBOR is “a benchmark rate that some of the world’s leading banks 
charge each other for short-term loans.” LIBOR, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia 
.com/terms/l/libor.asp [https://perma.cc/LMM8-BYGY]. It stands for 
IntercontinentalExchange London Interbank Offered Rate and serves as the first step to 
calculating interest rates on various loans throughout the world. Id. 
 165. See American International Group (AIG), Maiden Lane II and III, supra note 
161. 
 166. See id. 
 167. See id. 
 168. See id. 
 169. See id.; Actions Related to AIG, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., https://www.newy 
orkfed.org/aboutthefed/aig [https://perma.cc/E6NH-E46L] (“On January 14, 2011, the 
New York Fed’s assistance to AIG was terminated and its loans to AIG fully repaid. The 
New York Fed’s exit was part of a comprehensive recapitalization announced in 
September 2010 and closed on January 14, 2011, by the company, the New York Fed, 
the Treasury Department and the AIG Credit Facility Trust.”). 
 170. See Investment in AIG, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/aig/Pages/statu 
s.aspx [https://perma.cc/3MN9-G4KM] (last updated Dec. 11, 2013). 
 171. See Actions Related to AIG, supra note 169. 
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creation of Maiden Lane II, the FRBNY ceased this temporary role, 
getting back all cash collateral.172 
4. AIG Maiden Lane II and Maiden Lane III 
In November 2008, under a restructuring of the government’s 
financial support of AIG, the Fed and the Treasury created Maiden Lane 
II LLC (“ML II”) and Maiden Lane III LLC (“ML III”).173 ML II was 
formed to purchase the residential mortgage-backed security (“RMBS”) 
assets from AIG subsidiaries, while ML III was to purchase multi-sector 
collateralized debt obligations (“CDOs”) of AIG.174 The Fed lent $19.5 
billion to ML II in the form of a senior loan at an interest rate of the one-
month LIBOR plus 300 basis points.175 The disposition of ML II assets 
was completed at the end of February 2012, from which the Fed received 
$2.8 billion net gain, in addition to the repayment of the principal.176 The 
Fed invested $24.3 billion in ML III as a senior loan with an interest rate 
of the one-month LIBOR plus 100 basis points. 177  According to the 
FRBNY, the disposition of ML III assets was completed in September 
2012, from which the Fed received $6.6 billion in net gain, in addition to 
the repayment of the principal amount.178 
																																																																																																																																
 172. See id. 
 173. See Maiden Lane Transactions, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., https://www.newy 
orkfed.org/markets/maidenlane.html [https://perma.cc/3SLZ-JR2T] (click the “Maiden 
Lane II” and “Maiden Lane III” tabs in the table under the subheading “Historical 
Supplemental Survey Reports”). 
 174. See id. (click the “Overview” tab in the table under the subheading “Historical 
Supplemental Survey Reports”). 
 175. See id. (click the “Maiden Lane II” tab in the table under the subheading 
“Historical Supplemental Survey Reports”). 
 176. See id. (click the “Overview” tab in the table under the subheading “Historical 
Supplemental Survey Reports”). 
 177. See id. (click the “Maiden Lane III” tab in the table under the subheading 
“Historical Supplemental Survey Reports”). 
 178. See id. (click the “Overview” tab in the table under the subheading “Historical 
Supplemental Survey Reports”); Actions Related to AIG, supra note 169 (“The New York 
Fed’s management of the MLII and MLIII portfolios resulted in the full repayment of the 
New York Fed’s loans . . . and resulted in a combined net gain of approximately $9.4 
billion . . . .”). 
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5. Preferred Interest in AIA Aurora LLC and ALICO Holdings LLC 
On December 1, 2009, the FRBNY received preferred stock in AIA 
Aurora LLC and ALICO Holdings LLC in exchange for the reduction of 
the outstanding amount under the revolving credit facility.179 According 
to the FRBNY, the preferred interests generated an income of $26.4 
billion, resulting in $1.4 billion in net gain.180 As a result, the total net 
profit from the government’s various investments in AIG stands at $22.7 
billion.181 
Date 
Preferred 
interests 
in AIA 
Aurora 
LLC 
(millions of 
dollars) 
Accrued 
dividends 
on preferred 
interests 
in AIA Aurora 
LLC (millions of 
dollars) 
Preferred 
interests 
in ALICO 
Holdings LLC 
(millions of 
dollars) 
Accrued 
dividends 
on preferred 
interests 
in ALICO 
Holdings LLC 
(millions of 
dollars) 
12-02-09 16000.0 4.4 9000.0 2.5 
12-09-09 16000.0 19.7 9000.0 11.1 
12-16-09 16000.0 35.1 9000.0 19.7 
12-23-09 16000.0 50.4 9000.0 28.4 
12-30-09 16000.0 65.8 9000.0 37.0 
01-06-10 16067.9 13.2 9038.2 7.4 
Spreadsheet 9: Excerpt of Preferred Interest in AIA Aurora LLC and ALICO 
Holdings LLC Transaction Data 182 
 
  Max Combined  
Commitment 
(billions of 
dollars) 
Repayments, 
Canceled/Reduced 
Commitments, 
Interest/Fees/Gains 
(billions of dollars) 
Positive 
Return 
(billions of 
dollars) 
Federal Reserve $112.5  $130.2  +$17.7  
Fed Loans to AIG¹ $35.0  $41.8  +$6.8  
AIA/ALICO SPV,  
Preferred Interests 
$25.0  $26.4  +$1.4  
																																																																																																																																
 179. See American International Group (AIG), Maiden Lane II and III, BD. OF 
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/regreform/refor 
m-aig.htm [https://perma.cc/V7KY-YWH5] (last updated Feb. 12, 2016). 
 180. See Investment in AIG, supra note 170. 
 181. See id. 
 182. See American International Group (AIG), Maiden Lane II and III, supra note 
161. 
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Maiden Lane II & III $52.5  $62.0  +$9.5  
Treasury $69.8  $74.8  +$5.0  
Common Stock $47.5  $51.6  +$4.1  
Preferred Stock $22.3  $23.2  +$0.9  
Total $182.3 $205.0 +$22.7  
Table 1: Summary of Investment in AIG 183 
D. GENERAL MARKET SUPPORT 
The government employed various mechanisms to restart the 
markets for both short-term and long-term credit. 
1. Credit Market Programs Under TARP 
The Credit Market Programs under TARP were established to restart 
the credit market for small business and consumer lending.184 Under the 
general goal of stimulating the credit market, three different programs 
were created to achieve specific missions: the Public-Private Investment 
Program (“PPIP”), the SBA 7(a) Securities Purchase Program, and the 
TALF.185 
a. The Public-Private Investment Program 
The PPIP was created by the Treasury to restore the market for non-
agency RMBS and commercial mortgage-backed securities (“CMBS”).186 
These types of securities were central to the problems of the U.S. financial 
system but could not be addressed by other bailout programs. 187 
According to the Treasury website resource, in addition to the full 
recovery of the Treasury’s $18.6 billion investment, this program 
																																																																																																																																
 183. See Investment in AIG, supra note 170. 
 184. See Credit Market Programs, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/credit-market-
programs/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/N5NX-VHCP] (last updated Aug. 13, 
2015). 
 185. See id. 
 186. See Public-Private Investment Program: Program Purpose & Overview, U.S. 
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-
Programs/credit-market-programs/ppip/Pages/purpose-and-overview.aspx [https://perm 
a.cc/J3Z2-MD7U] (last updated July 21, 2012). 
 187. For instance, the TSLF focuses on agency securities and agency mortgage-
backed securities; the ST OMO only addresses agency mortgage-backed securities. 
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generated a net positive return of more than $3.9 billion in interest and 
proceeds.188 
b. SBA 7(a) Securities Purchase Program 
The SBA 7(a) loan refers to the type of loan specifically used to 
finance small business.189 Accordingly, purchasing securities backed by 
SBA 7(a) loans becomes an indirect way of providing liquidity to the 
small businesses.190 To help small businesses survive the crisis, the SBA 
7(a) Securities Purchase Program purchased SBA 7(a) securities worth 
$368 million, effectively reviving the SBA 7(a) market to its pre-crisis 
levels.191 With the end of this program on January 24, 2012, the Treasury 
made a total return of $9 million.192 
c. The Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility 
As a provider of long-term credit, the asset-backed securities 
(“ABS”) market experienced a tremendous hit during the crisis. 193 
Activity in the ABS market halted in the fourth quarter of 2008 because 
traditional ABS investors could no longer find leverage “from the 
conduits, securities lenders, and other entities” necessary for investors 
with certain risk-return profiles.194 
																																																																																																																																
 188. See Public-Private Investment Program, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/credit-market-
programs/ppip/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/M5EQ-HYP3] (last updated July 13, 
2015). 
 189. SBA 7(a) Securities Purchase Program, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/credit-market-p 
rograms/sba7a/Pages/Program-Purpose-And-Overview.aspx (last updated Dec. 9, 2013). 
 190. See id. 
 191. See SBA 7(a) Securities Purchase Program, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/credit-market-p 
rograms/sba7a/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/VC3S-ZABK] (last updated Dec. 9, 
2013). 
 192. See SBA 7(a) Securities Purchase Program: Program Status, U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/cre 
dit-market-programs/sba7a/Pages/Program-Status.aspx [https://perma.cc/MK64-UWC 
8] (last updated Dec. 9, 2013). 
 193. See Madigan, supra note 6. 
 194. See id. 
2017]     THE COSTS OF BAILOUTS IN THE 449 
                                     2007-08 FINANCIAL CRISIS 
Since the ABS market functioned as the center of originations of 
loans, its malfunction directly threatened the availability of other types of 
financing.195  To reinstate the ABS market, the Fed and the Treasury 
jointly created the TALF in March 2009 under the Fed’s authority as 
granted by Section 13(3) of the Act.196 By allowing borrowers to use their 
ABS as collateral, the TALF essentially facilitated the issuance of ABS 
collateralized by other types of loans.197 To avoid lending directly to 
borrowers, the Fed created the TALF LLC, a special purpose vehicle, to 
which the Treasury provided a subordinated loan.198 The TALF loans 
provided by the FRBNY were secured by collaterals, which could be sold 
to TALF LLC in case of the borrower’s default.199 The Treasury provided 
$1.4 billion to the TALF LLC, and all loans have since been repaid in 
full.200  In addition, the distributions made by the TALF LLC to the 
Treasury and the FRBNY amounted to $745.7 million, which represents 
the net positive return as of the date of this Comment.201 
2. Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund 
Liquidity Facility 
During the financial crisis, investors who lost confidence in the 
markets rushed to redeem funds from money market mutual funds 
(“MMMF”), driving a fire sale of MMMFs.202 A part of the MMMFs’ 
assets consisted of asset-backed commercial papers (“ABCPs”). 203 
																																																																																																																																
 195. See id. 
 196. See Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/talf.html [https://perma.cc/FWY7-4XC2]. 
 197. See id. 
 198. See id. 
 199. See Term Asset Backed Loan Facility: Program Purpose & Overview, U.S. 
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-
Programs/credit-market-programs/talf/Pages/Program-Purpose-And-Overview.aspx [htt 
ps://perma.cc/J6WY-CJHJ] (last updated Dec. 9, 2013). 
 200. See Term Asset Backed Loan Facility: Program Status, U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/cre 
dit-market-programs/talf/Pages/Program-Status.aspx [https://perma.cc/WSB5-K5XN] 
(last updated Dec. 12, 2013). 
 201. See id. 
 202. See Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity 
Facility (AMLF), BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., https://www.federalres 
erve.gov/regreform/reform-amlf.htm [https://perma.cc/YYW7-5H6Y] (last updated Feb. 
12, 2016). 
 203. See id. 
450 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
Although ABCPs were generally considered a liquid asset, a potential 
bear market for ABCPs would have induced losses to MMMFs, which 
could have rippled outwards into the financial market at large.204 
To alleviate the liquidity problem in the money markets, the AMLF 
functioned to create a market for the sale of ABCPs.205 Under the AMLF, 
the Fed-provided loans were specifically directed for acquiring the 
ABCPs from MMMFs. 206  The purchased ABCPs also served as the 
collateral to secure the loans.207 This program, created under the Fed’s 
Section 13(3) authority, lasted from September 2008 to February 2010.208 
At the time of closing, all loans were repaid.209 
Given the complete transaction data provided by the Fed,210 the daily 
return can be calculated by multiplying the loan amount, interest rate, and 
the number of days for which the loan was made, then dividing by 365. 
Pursuant to this calculation, the total gain from the AMLF program was 
approximated $543.497 million. 
Loan Date Borrower Loan 
Amount 
(millions 
of 
dollars) 
Maturity 
Date 
Interest 
Rate (%) 
09-22-08 BK OF NY MELLON 1,051.7  09-25-08 2.25 
09-22-08 BK OF NY MELLON 777.6  01-12-09 2.25 
09-22-08 BK OF NY MELLON 624.3  10-06-08 2.25 
09-22-08 BK OF NY MELLON 569.5  01-13-09 2.25 
09-22-08 BK OF NY MELLON 544.7  01-16-09 2.25 
09-22-08 BK OF NY MELLON 499.2  01-14-09 2.25 
09-22-08 BK OF NY MELLON 424.9  09-26-08 2.25 
09-22-08 BK OF NY MELLON 377.6  12-11-08 2.25 
Spreadsheet 10: Excerpt of AMLF Data211 
																																																																																																																																
 204. See id. 
 205. See id. 
 206. See id. 
 207. See id. 
 208. See id. 
 209. See id. 
 210. See id. 
 211. See id. 
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3. Commercial Paper Funding Facility 
In connection with the AMLF, the CPFF functioned to further boost 
the liquidity in money markets.212 Through financing the purchase of 
certain types of commercial paper, the CPFF enabled liquidity to reach 
both non-financial and financial issuers of commercial paper.213  This 
facility operated through the purchase of commercial papers by the CPFF 
LLC, with loans provided by the FRBNY. 214  Further, the issuers of 
commercial paper who benefited from this program were asked to pay a 
fee. 215  This program, created pursuant to the Fed’s authority under 
Section 13(3), lasted from October 2008 to February 2010.216 All loans 
were fully repaid to the FRBNY, and all commercial papers were repaid 
to the CPFF LLC. 217  With the available data, the total net return is 
calculated to be $1.222 billion.218 
Loan date  Maturity date 
Interest 
rate (%) 
Loan amount 
(millions of 
dollars) 
10-27-08 01-26-09 1.50 52,681.2  
10-28-08 01-26-09 1.50 35,540.3  
10-29-08 01-27-09 1.50 56,556.0  
10-30-08 01-28-09 1.00 41,221.7  
10-31-08 01-29-09 1.00 40,472.9  
11-03-08 01-30-09 1.00 8,891.0  
11-04-08 02-02-09 1.00 2,086.7  
																																																																																																																																
 212. See Press Release: Board Announces Additional Details Regarding the 
Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF), BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE 
SYS. (Oct. 14, 2008), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081 
014b.htm [https://perma.cc/6VXV-7Q5R]. 
 213. See Commercial Paper Funding Facility, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. 
RESERVE SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/cpff.htm [https://perma. 
cc/Y9MK-GZVA] (last updated Feb. 5, 2010). 
 214. See Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF), BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE 
FED. RESERVE SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_cpff.htm [https: 
//perma.cc/W7QK-YRLT] (last updated Feb. 12, 2016). 
 215. See id. 
 216. See id; Commercial Paper Funding Facility: Frequently Asked Questions, FED. 
RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/cpff_faq.html [https://per 
ma.cc/X35C-NMB7]. 
 217. See Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF), supra note 214. 
 218. Similar to previous calculations, the gain from each single transaction is 
computed by multiplying the loan amount, interest rate, and number of days, and then 
dividing by 365. 
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11-05-08 02-03-09 1.00 5,674.3  
11-06-08 02-04-09 1.00 1,032.5  
11-07-08 02-05-09 1.00 2,579.1  
11-10-08 02-09-09 1.00 6,315.5  
11-12-08 02-10-09 1.00 3,886.2  
11-13-08 02-11-09 1.00 3,620.2  
11-14-08 02-12-09 1.00 3,167.4  
11-17-08 02-17-09 1.00 2,971.5  
11-18-08 02-17-09 1.00 1,190.3  
11-19-08 02-17-09 1.00 2,460.3  
Spreadsheet 11: Excerpt of Loans to the CPFF LLC Data219 
 
Total discount 
rate + Credit 
enhancement 
surcharge (%) Issuer name 
3.89 AMSTEL FUNDING CORP 
2.88 BTM CAPITAL CORP 
2.88 BANCO ESPIRITO SANTO NA 
3.88 BAVARIA UNIVERSAL FNDG 
2.87 BAYERISCHE LANDESBK GIRO 
3.87 BELMONT FUNDING LLC 
2.88 CGD N AMER FINANCE LLC 
3.87 CHESHAM FINANCE LLC 
3.86 CROWN POINT CAPITAL CO 
3.89 CHRYSLER FIN CONDUIT AUT 
3.88 CHRYSLER FIN CONDUIT AUT 
3.88 DEALERS CAPITAL ACCESS 
2.87 DEXIA DELAWARE LLC 
3.85 EBBETS FUNDING LLC 
3.88 EBURY FINANCE LLC 
Spreadsheet 12: Excerpt of the Purchase of Commercial Paper Data220 
4. Agency Mortgage-Backed Securities Purchase Program 
To stabilize the long-term interest rate and thereby stimulate the 
market for long-term securities, the Fed decided to increase its holdings 
																																																																																																																																
 219. See Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF), supra note 214. 
 220. See id. 
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of MBS. 221  To achieve this goal, the Fed created the Agency MBS 
Purchase Program in November 2008 pursuant to its authority under 
Section 14 of the Act.222 When the purchasing of MBS concluded in 
March 2010, the Fed acquired agency MBS totaling $1.25 trillion.223 
Because any liquidation of the MBS portfolio would potentially disrupt 
the housing market, the Fed intends to hold the MBS until its maturity 
date.224 This program is currently making a profit through the generated 
interest.225 
Since the Fed has not made the detailed transaction data officially 
available, the gain is calculated based on data from the Bloomberg 
terminal.226 The total gain of the Agency MBS Purchase Program is the 
sum of total “interest amount” and the total “mark to market PNL.”227 The 
interest amount is calculated by multiplying the total trade amount,228 
interest rate, and the number of days, and then dividing by 365. Because 
this program is still ongoing, the gain or loss should be estimated by the 
“mark to market PNL,” a more realistic appraisal of this program’s 
current position. The “mark to market PNL” is calculated by the 
difference in last price and purchase price divided by the purchase price, 
then multiplied by the total trade amount. Pursuant to my calculation, the 
total gain of this program is approximately $536 billion. 
Total 
(millions 
of 
dollars)  
Purchase 
price  
Interest 
(%) 
Number 
of days Last Price 
Interest 
Amount 
(millions of 
dollars) 
Mark to 
Market PNL 
(millions of 
dollars) 
250 101.17 5.00 2643.00 110.203125 90.51369863 22.3216492 
150 97.17 3.50 2671.00 105.83 38.41849315 13.36542914 
350 97.82 3.50 2736.00 105.08 91.82465753 25.96957422 
42 96.81 3.50 2674.00 105.52 10.76926027 3.776843818 
																																																																																																																																
 221. See Agency Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) Purchase Program, BD. OF 
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/ref 
orm_mbs.htm [https://perma.cc/8U4R-AGPG] (last updated Feb. 12, 2016). 
 222. See id. 
 223. See id. 
 224. See LABONTE, supra note 12, at 19. 
 225. See id. 
 226. Although the government released the original CUSIP and purchase price, the 
data does not include the current market price, and the CUSIP has been reused. My data 
source is Bloomberg terminal. The complete data is attached as Appendix 2. 
 227. PNL is an acronym for Profit and Loss. 
 228. The total trade amount stands for the total face value at the time of the trade when 
the securities are purchased or sold. 
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200 91.50 3.50 2643.00 105.48 50.68767123 30.56693989 
1450 102.36 4.00 2484.00 103.44 394.7178082 15.30892244 
1275 102.26 4.00 2819.00 103.41 393.8876712 14.35352641 
2475 101.61 4.00 2792.00 104.02 757.2821918 58.59582595 
1800 100.77 4.00 2762.00 104.11 544.8328767 59.64944924 
2500 101.26 4.00 2730.00 103.86 747.9452055 64.17576042 
Spreadsheet 13: Excerpt of MBS Data229 
E. THE BAILOUT OF THE AUTO INDUSTRY 
The Automotive Industry Financing Program (“AIFP”) was invented 
to help the U.S. auto industry avert its imminent failure.230 The Treasury 
invested approximately $80 billion through the AIFP, under which 
Chrysler received $12.5 billion, GM received $51 billion, and Ally 
Financial received $17.2 billion. 231  Chrysler repaid more than $11.2 
billion of the $12.5 billion committed loan in May 2011; thereafter the 
Treasury fully exited its investment in Chrysler.232 On December 9, 2013, 
the Treasury fully exited its investment in GM, recovering $39.7 billion 
from its original investment of $51.0 billion.233 On December 19, 2014, 
the Treasury sold all of its holding in Ally Financial, making a positive 
return of about $2.4 billion.234 In sum, the bailout of auto industry resulted 
in a total loss of $10.2 billion.235 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																																																																																																
 229. See infra Appendix 2. 
 230. See Auto Industry, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/initi 
atives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/automotive-programs/Pages/default.aspx [htt 
ps://perma.cc/HB64-RMFR] (last updated Jan. 8, 2015). 
 231. See id. 
 232. See Auto Industry: Program Status, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/automotive-pro 
grams/Pages/purpose.aspx [https://perma.cc/X9YE-XAJ7] (last updated Dec. 22, 2014). 
 233. See id. 
 234. See id. 
 235. See id. 
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Table 2: AIFP 
III. BAILOUT IS THE CORRECT AND EFFECTIVE SOLUTION 
This part provides a three-part analysis of the 2007-08 bailout 
programs. First, by summarizing the gain or loss along with the rate of 
return for all the bailout programs, this part lays a foundation for assessing 
which programs can be considered good investments of taxpayer money. 
Secondly, by evaluating how well the bailouts complied with Bagehot’s 
dictum, this part sheds light on the ongoing discussion regarding the 
necessary innovations in applying the dictum. Finally, in light of the 
amendments made by Dodd-Frank regarding the government’s bailout 
powers, this part analyzes how relevant provisions of Dodd-Frank will 
impact the creation of similar programs in the future. 
A. THE 2007-08 BAILOUTS WERE GOOD INVESTMENTS  
Program Total Return 
(Billions of 
dollars) 
Total 
Days 
Total 
Return (%) 
Annual 
Return 
(%) 
Modified Discount 
Window 
0.978 1246 0.003 0.001 
TAF 4.150 840 0.109 0.047 
Central Bank Liquidity 
Swap 
5.747 905 0.057 0.023 
ST OMO 1.259 324 0.147 0.166 
TSLF 0.699 504 0.035 0.025 
PDCF 0.376 242 0.004 0.006 
TLGP 9.300       
AGP 3.185 365 1.058 1.058 
TIP 4.400 365 22.000 22.000 
CPP (Ongoing) 33.800 2803 10.627 1.324 
Bear Stearns- JP Morgan 0.004 3 0.031 3.844 
Repay 
Date 
Loan amount 
(billions of 
dollars) 
Pay amount 
(billions of 
dollars) 
P&L (billions 
of dollars) 
Chrysler  05/11 12.5 11.2 (1.3) 
GM 12/9/13 51 39.7 (11.3) 
Ally Financial 12/18/14 17.2 19.6 2.4 
Total  80.7 70.5 (10.2) 
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Maiden Lane LLC 0.765 1553 2.656 0.618 
Fannie-Freddy 62.500 2407 21.333 2.976 
AIG Revolving Credit 6.800 744 8.000 3.848 
AIG Security Borrowing 0.051 44 0.006 0.052 
Maiden Lane II 2.800 1237 14.359 4.038 
Maiden Lane III 6.600 1420 27.160 6.371 
AIA Aurora LLC ALICO 1.400 357 5.600 5.729 
PPIP 3.900 2017 17.727 2.997 
SBA 7(a) Security 
Purchase 
0.009 694 2.446 1.279 
TALF 0.746 486 53.264 37.807 
AMLF 0.543 386 0.250 0.236 
CPFF 1.222 546 0.165 0.111 
Agency MBS 536 2971 42.880 4.481 
AIFP -10.200 2269 -12.639 -2.150 
Total (Without Agency 
MBS) 
141.5700742       
Total (With Agency MBS) 677.5700742    
Table 3: Summary of Gain/Loss and Rate of Return of Each Bailout Program 
 
Table 3 provides a summary of the dollar amount of gain or loss, as 
well as the rate of return for all of the bailout programs since 2008. Almost 
all programs (with the one exception of the Auto Industry Bailouts) had a 
positive return. The total positive return of the Agency MBS is about $677 
billion, while the total without the Agency MBS is about $141 billion.236 
To guarantee a more accurate evaluation, this Comment prefers to choose 
the total without Agency MBS as the basis for assessing the final tally of 
all the bailout programs. The exclusion of the Agency MBS is based on 
the uncertainty both in its calculation and categorization. The uncertainty 
in calculation stems from the unavailability of the complete data, as the 
original MBS portfolio has not fully liquidated yet. Because the currently 
available data cannot clearly tell whether the original MBS is paid in 
advance or not, the calculation of the gain from the MBS program is based 
on the theoretic PNL, which might also cause an overestimation of the 
actual interest amount. The uncertainty in categorization lies in the 
																																																																																																																																
 236. This number is close to the projected returns of $166 billion by Timothy 
Geithner. See TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER, STRESS TEST: REFLECTIONS ON FINANCIAL CRISES 
497 (Broadway Books, 2015). 
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ongoing discussion about whether the MBS program is an exercise of 
monetary policy, rather than a bailout.237 Unlike a bailout program that 
provides liquidity on a temporary basis, a monetary policy is a long-term 
strategy that focuses on controlling the quantity of money in circulation 
through the buying and selling of securities.238 By purchasing the MBS 
from primary dealers, the Fed intended to increase the money supply with 
a long-term goal of increasing lending and stimulating the economy.239 
The fact that the Fed intends to hold the MBS until their maturity date 
provides further grounds for characterizing this program as an exercise of 
monetary policy.240 Even without the Agency MBS, the total positive 
return of $141 billion reassures the taxpayers not only that their money 
was not lost, but also that the programs generated billions of dollars in 
profits. 
From an investor’s perspective, the bailouts can be considered good 
investments of taxpayer money. While active investors—whose 
portfolios have high turnover rates—care about the annual rate of return, 
passive investors—i.e., the “buy and hold” investors—usually care more 
about the total percentage of return.241 To accommodate the different 
information needs of the active and passive investors, Table 3 provides 
the rate of return both in the form of the total percentage return and the 
annual rate of return.242 
To begin, passive investors will likely be impressed by programs that 
generated a total percentage of return of more than 10%.243 As shown in 
																																																																																																																																
 237. See LABONTE, supra note 12, at 17-19 (clarifying that the purpose of holding the 
MBS portfolio was to lower the interest rate in the private borrowing market, thus 
stimulating interest-sensitive types of spending, such as on residential housing, 
automobiles, etc.). 
 238. See id. 
 239. See id. 
 240. See id. at 19 (stating that, in its normalization statement, the Fed ruled out MBS 
sales in the near future). 
 241. “Buy and hold is a passive investment strategy in which an investor buys stocks 
and holds them for a long period of time, regardless of fluctuations in the market.” Buy 
and Hold, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/buyandhold.asp [https: 
//perma.cc/7VKL-4R2N]. An investor who buys and holds will generally ignore the 
short-term daily price movement once he/she gets into a position. Id. 
 242. Total percentage return is the return on investment, calculated as: net profit/total 
investment * 100. Annual rate of return is the annualized total percentage of return, 
calculated as: [(1 + total return) ^ 365 / total days - 1] * 100. 
 243. Index bond funds pay annual returns of much less. See iShares Core U.S. 
Aggregate Bond ETF, ISHARES, https://www.ishares.com/us/products/239458/ishares-
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Table 3, these programs are: TIP (22%), CPP (10.62%), Fannie-Freddy 
(21.33%), Maiden Lane II (14.35%), Maiden Lane III (27.16%), PPIP 
(17.72%), and TALF (53.26%). For active investors, there are two 
programs with a significantly high annual rate of return that deserve to be 
highlighted: TIP (22%) and TALF (37.8%). A more in-depth analysis of 
the rate of return will require a comparison between the rate of return with 
the market rate at the time the investment was made. In a low liquidity 
market, such as the market during a financial crisis, finding a comparable 
benchmark rate is not easy because most market makers do not want to 
provide large firm quotes that would greatly affect the true value of the 
benchmark. As a result, the Fed Fund rate, with its continuing lending 
possibility, shall be chosen as the safe annualized comparable market rate 
in a low liquidity market. In that sense, a program with a rate of return 
that is higher than the Fed Fund rate should be considered a good 
investment. Referring to Fed Fund rates in Spreadsheet 1, consider the 
highest Fed Fund rate (5.02%) to simplify this comparison.244 By using 
the highest Fed Fund rate, the annualized benchmark rate could be 
calculated easily. Because 5.02% represented the highest yield that a risk-
free investment could produce,245 for passive investors programs with a 
total percentage rate of more than 5.02% during that time can be 
considered a good investment: AIG Revolving Credit (8%) and AIA 
Aurora LLC ALICO (5.6%). For active investors who look at the annual 
rate, the list of good investments needs to include Maiden Lane III 
(6.371%) and AIA Aurora LLC ALICO (5.729%). Again, this Comment 
takes a rather conservative view in making such an assessment. The list 
of good investment programs ought to be more inclusive considering the 
fact that the Fed Fund rate after August 1, 2007 was much lower than 
5.02%.246  Also, to guarantee a more accurate evaluation, the Agency 
MBS with a total percentage return of 42.88% and annual rate of return 
of 4.48% has been excluded. 
																																																																																																																																
core-total-us-bond-market-etf [https://perma.cc/LGK4-54RB] (showing that the five-
year annualized return is 2.27% and the ten-year annualized return is 4.14%). 
 244. See supra Section II.A.1, Spreadsheet 1. The Fed Fund Rate after August 1, 2007 
has been much lower than 5.02%. 
 245. Fed Fund rate is generally considered the risk free rate. 
 246. Shown from both Spreadsheets, the Fed Fund rate after August 1, 2007 has 
always been lower than 5.02%. See supra Section II.A.1, Spreadsheet 1; supra Section 
II.A.2, Spreadsheet 2. 
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B. BAGEHOT’S DICTUM AND NECESSARY INNOVATION 
In their broad structure, the 2007-08 bailout programs are consistent 
with the guiding principles of Bagehot’s dictum.247 Most of the financial 
institutions that received bailout lending were illiquid rather than 
insolvent,248 the lending was generally secured by good collateral,249 and 
the loans were charged with above-market interest rates.250 
More importantly, the success of the 2007-08 bailouts demonstrated 
that Bagehot’s dictum requires an evolving interpretation and flexible 
application.251  For instance, Bagehot’s dictum failed to anticipate the 
stigma of borrowing under the discount window, which was solved 
through the creation of TAF.252 The complexity of the current financial 
structure and the presence of many gray areas render it impossible to draw 
a clear line in imposing each of the three criteria under the dictum.253 
For instance, there might be a lack of clarity in distinguishing 
illiquidity from insolvency as the prolonged duration of illiquidity might 
cause a firm’s ultimate insolvency.254 As a result, applying the criteria of 
																																																																																																																																
 247. See Casey & Posner, supra note 7, at 523 (“[A] striking fact about the 2007-2008 
rescues is that nearly all of them were ex post efficient . . . most of the rescues followed 
the Bagehot dictum: most of the financial institutions suffered liquidity shortages but 
were otherwise solvent; the loans to them were repaid in full.”). 
 248. See Squire, supra note 18, at 105-09 (concluding that the private-sector financial 
institutions were solvent during the crisis by testing whether the bailed-out firms 
“ultimately generated enough profits to repay the government with interest while 
continuing to service their private debt”). 
 249. As argued by Madigan, the collateral might take various forms: some programs 
apply a haircut to the market value of securities, for instance, the PDCF and TSLF; others 
might take a fee as security, for instance, the CPFF. See Madigan, supra note 6. 
 250. The evidence of the Fed charging above-market interest on loans might be direct 
or circumstantial. As direct evidence, programs charged with an interest rate that is higher 
than the comparable Fed Fund rate shall be deemed as having been charged with an 
above-market interest rate. Circumstantial evidence might be that when the usage of a 
particular program started to fall, it evidenced that the interest rate charged by that 
program was higher than the then-existing market rate, leaving no incentive for 
institutions to borrow from the bailout program. See Madigan, supra note 6 (reasoning 
that in examining the pricing of a particular program, the fact that the usage of a program 
has fallen to zero leads to a reasonable inference that the rate charged by that program 
was representing a penalty rate compared to the market rate at that point). 
 251. See id. 
 252. See id. 
 253. See id. 
 254. See id.; Bernanke, supra note 2. 
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“lending to solvent firms” would entail decision-making that weighs a 
firm’s financial conditions against the consequence of that firm’s possible 
default.255 Moreover, the illiquidity and the fire sale caused by it could 
suppress the price of securities, causing difficulties in assessing the real 
value of “good collateral.”256  Further, the definition of a high rate might 
vary depending a particular firm’s size and ability to borrow; also whether 
a rate represents a high rate needs to be analyzed in connection with other 
terms, e.g., the haircut applied on the securities.257 Therefore, Bagehot’s 
dictum shall be viewed more as a concept guiding the methodology of 
creating bailout mechanisms, rather than a straightforward application.258 
In applying Bagehot’s dictum in a crisis, some practical concerns, 
including the worsening of market panic and its potential adverse effects 
on the entire economy, would justify the necessary deviations. For 
instance, lending to broker-dealers through PDCF and TSLF might seem 
to be unconventional, but in light of the unprecedented market shock that 
could subject the housing market to trillions of dollars of loss, the 
intervention of a liquidity provider of last resort was the only viable way 
of preventing the market breakdown.259 Moreover, lending to the auto 
industry might seem to deviate from the dictum, as the auto firms were 
not judged to be solvent.260 Nonetheless, the consideration of preventing 
major layoffs provided their bailouts the necessary legitimacy.261 
																																																																																																																																
 255. See Madigan, supra note 6. 
 256. See id. 
 257. See id. (“[T]he haircuts set on the primary dealer facilities represented a 
generalization of the dictum to ‘lend at a high rate.’”). 
 258. See id. (arguing that a straightforward application of Bagehot’s dictum is 
impractical and impossible due to the blurred boundary between illiquidity and 
insolvency, the uncertainty in valuing the collateral in the crisis, as well as the complicacy 
in setting the penalty rate that could accurately reflect the specific circumstances of a 
particular firm). 
 259. See id. (arguing that although the creation of these two lending programs might 
appear as unconventional because their facilities involved lending to non-depository 
institutions, given the size and the extent of the unprecedented market shock, this type of 
credit extension was absolutely necessary to prevent the breakdown of the entire 
economy). 
 260. See Casey & Posner, supra note 7, at 516 (concluding that the bailout of the auto 
industry was a true bailout because the auto firms had been determined insolvent). 
 261. See id. at 517 (“Even conservative estimates suggest that if viewed merely as a 
jobs program, the bailout was inexpensive.”). 
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C. IMPACT OF DODD-FRANK 
This Comment will focus on three aspects in which Dodd-Frank will 
likely impact the creation of bailout programs in the future. First, Dodd-
Frank’s enhanced disclosure requirement for the discount window will 
likely worsen the DW stigma. Second, Dodd-Frank’s restriction on the 
FDIC’s guarantee authority could render the financial system more 
vulnerable in a crisis. Lastly, Dodd-Frank’s reduction of the Fed’s 
emergency lending authority could constrain the Fed’s exercise of its 
normal LOLR authority. 
1. Title XI of Dodd-Frank and its Impact on Discount Window 
Title XI of Dodd-Frank opens the discount window policy for audits, 
which, together with its imposition of greater disclosure requirements, 
would worsen the problem of the DW stigma. Use of the discount window 
is one of the Fed’s most basic powers in monetary policy matters. To 
encourage its use, the Fed’s decisions regarding the discount window are 
insulated from the audits of the Government Accountability Office 
(“GAO”). 262  Even with this protective insulation, banks were still 
reluctant to borrow from the discount window due to the DW stigma,263 
as evidenced by the ineffectiveness of the Primary Credit Program (the 
Modified Discount Window).264 Despite this stigma, Title XI265 of Dodd-
Frank imposes greater disclosure requirements on the Fed’s lending 
activities.266 Title XI of Dodd-Frank includes provisions that allow the 
GAO for the first time to audit open market operations, discount window 
lending, actions taken under the Fed’s emergency authority, and programs 
																																																																																																																																
 262. See The Federal Banking Agency Audit Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–320, 92 
Stat. 391 (prohibiting the GAO from auditing the Fed’s activities relating to “monetary 
policy matters, including discount window operations, reserves of member banks, 
securities credit, interest on deposits, and open market operations”). 
 263. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text. 
 264. See Madigan, supra note 7 (stating that the modified discount window appeared 
to have only limited success in stemming the panic as concerns about stigma discouraged 
many banks from drawing from the discount window credit). 
 265. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, §§ 1101-1109, 124 Stat. 1376, 2113-2129 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 12 U.S.C.). 
 266. See MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FEDERAL RESERVE: OVERSIGHT 
AND DISCLOSURE ISSUES 5 (2016). 
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created in response to the financial crisis.267 These provisions require the 
Fed to release individual lending records for emergency facilities created 
during a financial crisis, revealing borrowers’ identities and loans’ 
terms.268 In particular, the Fed must also release the individual records for 
discount window lending within two years of the transaction.269 As a 
result of Dodd-Frank, on March 31, 2011, the Fed released individual 
lending records for emergency facilities revealing borrowers’ identities 
for the first time;270 the Fed also began to release the individual records 
for discount window and open market operations in the third quarter of 
2012.271 
Such enhanced disclosure requirements of identifying the borrowers 
will make the DW stigma even worse.272 Because revealing borrowers’ 
identities will likely weaken investors’ confidence,273 banks would rather 
borrow at a higher rate from sources that would not uncover their 
borrowing. 274  The magnitude of the DW stigma can be proven by 
evidence of banks’ opportunity costs in avoiding the stigma during the 
crisis.275 For instance, after the creation of the TAF, in which the auction 
format of fund lending helped protect borrowers’ identities, banks were 
willing to pay $172 million more per auction for interest, rather than 
																																																																																																																																
 267. See id. 
 268. See id. 
 269. See id. 
 270. See Fed Releases Discount-Window Lending Records Under Court Order, 
WALL ST. PIT (Mar. 31, 2011), http://wallstreetpit.com/69221-fed-releases-discount-win 
dow-lending-records-under-court-order/ [https://perma.cc/B9UP-7JSY]. 
 271. See Federal Reserve Publishes Quarterly Data for Discount Window Lending 
and Open Market Transactions, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20120928a.htm [https://per 
ma.cc/D4Y6-5AEK] (last updated Sept. 28, 2012); Quarterly Transaction Data, BD. OF 
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/ref 
orm_quarterly_transaction.htm [https://perma.cc/NZ79-GU3S] (last updated Dec. 28, 
2012). 
 272. See BEN S. BERNANKE, THE COURAGE TO ACT: A MEMOIR OF A CRISIS AND ITS 
AFTERMATH 465 (W.W. Norton & Co., 2015) (“[A]lthough lagged disclosure is a lot 
better than immediate disclosure, the new disclosure requirements for discount window 
may still increase the stigma of borrowing from the Fed in a panic.”); LABONTE, supra 
note 266, at 12-15. 
 273. See LABONTE, supra note 266, at 12-13. 
 274. See id. 
 275. See ARMANTIER, GHYSELS, SARKAR & SHRADER, supra note 77, at 4. 
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borrowing from the discount window.276 Such opportunity cost, though 
significant, is totally justified in light of the destabilizing consequences 
of the DW stigma following the release of borrowing institutions’ 
identities, as evidenced by the deposit runs during the Great Depression 
after the release of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation,277 as well as 
by the “TARP stigma” after the release of the names of TARP 
recipients.278 In balancing the purpose of the disclosure and its possible 
consequences, this “naming and shaming” type of disclosure appears to 
be unnecessarily aggressive.279 Because a limited disclosure, meaning one 
that includes programs and activities but omits the identification of 
borrowers, could sufficiently serve the oversight purpose, the detailed 
identity disclosure that serves the mere purpose of discerning favoritism 
seems to be less valuable during a crisis.280 In weighing such limited 
benefits against the potentially exacerbated DW stigma, the provisions of 
enhanced disclosure under Dodd-Frank call for further deliberation. 
2. The “Systemic Risk Exception” and the Temporary Liquidity 
Guarantee Program 
The FDIC’s guarantee was viewed as one of the turning points of the 
crisis.281 By standing behind the obligations of the banking system, the 
FDIC’s guarantee prevented an all-out run on the financial system.282 In 
creating the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (“TLGP”), the 
FDIC evoked the “systemic risk exception” under the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Act’s (the “FDIA”) Section 13(c)(4)(G)(i). 283  Though 
guarantee of the senior unsecured debt issued by bank holding companies 
																																																																																																																																
 276. See id. (“[The banks] incurred an additional interest cost of $172 million per 
auction, resulting in a 7.5% increase in their interest payments and a decrease of 17 bps 
in their pre-tax return on assets (ROA).”). 
 277. See LABONTE, supra note 266, at 13. 
 278. See ARMANTIER, GHYSELS, SARKAR & SHRADER, supra note 77, at 34 (noting 
that some institutions that accepted financial assistance through TARP “were 
subsequently branded as having ‘TARP stigma’”). 
 279. See LABONTE, supra note 266, at 13 (stating that the “naming and shaming” type 
of disclosure would be detrimental to financial stability). 
 280. See id. 
 281. See GEITHNER, supra note 236, at 230-31. 
 282. See id. 
 283. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G)(i) (2012); Walker, supra note 17, at 686. 
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has been deemed questionable, 284  the “systemic risk exception” did 
provide sound authorization for such a guarantee. 285  The decision to 
extend the FDIC’s guarantee to the new unsecured debt of bank holding 
companies was made after deliberating about the appropriate boundaries 
of the FDIC’s guarantee authority, and balancing that authority with the 
necessity of preventing runs on the most vulnerable parts of the banking 
system.286 Despite the legitimacy of this program and the $9.3 billion 
profit made from it, Dodd-Frank significantly cut back the FDIC’s 
authority with respect to the systemic risk exception by creating a hurdle 
that would make the creation of a similar debt guarantee program almost 
impossible in the future.287 This hurdle was established through two steps. 
First, Dodd-Frank amended Section 13(c)(4)(G)(i) of the FDIA, limiting 
the use of “systemic risk exception” to only one scenario, i.e., for winding 
up a failed depository institution for which the FDIC has been appointed 
receiver. 288  Second, Dodd-Frank permits the FDIC to guarantee the 
additional obligations of solvent deposit banks during times of severe 
economic distress,289 but simultaneously suspends the FDIC’s parallel 
																																																																																																																																
 284. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-100, REGULATORS’ USE OF 
SYSTEMIC RISK EXCEPTION RAISES MORAL HAZARD CONCERNS AND OPPORTUNITIES 
EXIST TO CLARIFY THE PROVISION 1 (2010) (noting that the FDIC’s direct assistance to 
institutions that had never received such assistance before, such as “healthy” banks, bank 
holding companies, and other bank affiliates, raised questions as to the interpretation of 
the scope of the FDIC’s authority). 
 285. See Walker, supra note 17, at 689 (“In the view of the U.S. Treasury and the 
Federal Reserve, the ‘systemic risk exception’ . . . did authorize these guarantee 
programs.”). 
 286. See GEITHNER, supra note 236, at 230-35. The FDIC’s final decision of 
guarantying the new unsecured debt of bank holding companies as well as their 
commercial bank subsidiaries, but not of their broker-dealer subsidiaries or their existing 
debt, was made after considering both (i) the need to keep the FDIC’s authority within 
formal boundaries of the bank safety net, and (ii) the potential consequence that setting a 
dividing line between what is guaranteed and what is not may spark a run on firms that 
are just beyond the safety line. Id. 
 287. See BERNANKE, supra note 272, at 464-65 (“The legislation also restricted the 
FDIC’s authority to guarantee bank debt . . . now the FDIC would need congressional 
approval in addition to the concurrence of the Fed and the Treasury secretary—not an 
easy hurdle to clear, as we saw with the TARP vote. And the FDIC no longer could 
invoke the systemic risk exception for specific firms that had allowed it during the crisis 
to help stabilize Citigroup.”); Walker, supra note 17, at 698-99. 
 288. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G)(i) (2012). 
 289. Id. § 5612 (2012). 
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authority under Section 13(c)(4)(G)(i) of the FDIA.290 In contrast with the 
FDIC’s previous independent authority, the exercise of new guarantee 
authority requires congressional approval in addition to the concurrence 
of the Fed and the Treasury secretary.291 Given the severity of the hurdle, 
the creation of a broad guarantee program such as the TLGP seems to be 
impossible in the future.292 
3. Bear Stearns and AIG, and Curtailment of the Fed’s Section 13(3) 
Authority 
Despite the profit made from the loans to Bear Stearns and the AIG 
bailouts, Dodd-Frank considered such lending as evidence that Section 
13(3) granted the Fed excessive authority. To disable the Fed’s ability to 
make similar types of loan, Dodd-Frank reduced the Fed’s emergency 
lending authority.293 In particular, Section 1101 of Dodd-Frank removes 
the Fed’s power of lending to any single institution and limits Fed’s 
lending only to institutions participating in facilities with “broad-based 
eligibility,” meaning a program or facility designed to provide liquidity 
to an identifiable market or a sector of the financial system.294 The Federal 
Reserve Board expressly indicated that the purpose of these restrictions 
was to prevent the Fed from lending to a failing firm as was done in the 
case of Bear Stearns and AIG.295 Dodd-Frank envisaged that the criteria 
																																																																																																																																
 290. See id. § 5613(a) (“Suspension of parallel Federal Deposit Insurance Act 
authority. Effective upon July 21, 2010, the Corporation may not exercise its authority 
under section 1823(c)(4)(G)(i) of this title to establish any widely available debt 
guarantee program for which section 5612 of this title would provide authority.”); 
Walker, supra note 17, at 698-700. 
 291. See BERNANKE, THE COURAGE TO ACT, supra note 272, at 465; Walker, supra 
note 17, at 699. 
 292. See Walker, supra note 17, at 700. 
 293. See Walker, supra note 17, at 690. 
 294. See 12 U.S.C. § 343(3)(B)(i) (2012) (“Such policies and procedures shall be 
designed to ensure that any emergency lending program or facility is for the purpose of 
providing liquidity to the financial system, and not to aid a failing financial company . . 
. .”); Extensions of Credit by Federal Reserve Banks, 80 Fed. Reg. 78,959-01 (Dec. 18, 
2015) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 201) (“The Dodd-Frank Act amended section 13(3) to 
remove the general authority to lend to an individual, partnership, or corporation and to 
replace that general authority with the limited authority to extend emergency credit only 
to participants in a program or facility with broad-based eligibility designed for the 
purpose of providing liquidity to the financial system.”) (emphasis added); Walker, supra 
note 17, at 690. 
 295. See Walker, supra note 17, at 690. 
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of broad-based eligibility would channel the provided liquidity to the 
entire financial system, rather than remaining in a particular distressed 
firm.296 To buttress that purpose, Dodd-Frank also invented a new orderly 
liquidation authority (the “OLA”).297 The OLA allows the FDIC to put a 
failing firm into receivership, thereby forcing shareholders and creditors 
of the firm to bear the loss.298 
Although conceived with good intentions, Dodd-Frank’s 
preventative provisions are unwisely restrictive, reflecting a 
misunderstanding of Bagehot’s dictum. First, during the financial crisis, 
the notion of “letting failing firms fail” would be a recipe for creating a 
systemic disaster. 299  For big financial institutions that have extensive 
counterparty relationships, such as AIG and Bear Stearns, the failure of 
one particular firm threatens the failure of a whole system.300 Therefore, 
providing liquidity to those particular big firms contains profound 
significance in preventing the potential dysfunction of the entire financial 
system. 301  Meanwhile, due to the interconnection between financial 
institutions, providing liquidity to the largest interconnected institutions 
will greatly reduce counterparty risk, relieving financial stress in 
marketplaces that promote greater liquidity in all asset classes. In this 
sense, providing liquidity to large interconnected institutions equals 
providing liquidity to the financial system. As a result, Dodd-Frank’s 
requirement of finding “broad-based eligibility,” along with the narrow 
interpretation that limits provision of liquidity to a “financial market,” 
seems to be overly restrictive and is essentially denying the 
interconnectedness of the financial system. 
Secondly, Dodd-Frank’s bias against lending to specific institutions 
constitutes a deviation from Bagehot’s dictum. 302  Bagehot’s dictum 
																																																																																																																																
 296. See Extensions of Credit by Federal Reserve Banks, 80 Fed. Reg. at 78,960-62 
(Dec. 18, 2015); Walker, supra note 17, at 690-91. 
 297. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381-5394; Walker, supra note 17, at 694-95. 
 298. See Walker, supra note 17, at 696. 
 299. See GEITHNER, supra note 236, at 518 (“Let failing firms fail. Let the creditors 
who financed their binges pay the price. But that is a recipe for making a systemic crisis 
worse.”); Walker, supra note 17, at 714-15. 
 300. See Walker, supra note 17, at 718-20 n.145. 
 301. See Letter from Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. 
Reserve Sys., to the Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n 9 (Nov. 4, 2010) (“The rationale for 
providing credit support to particular institutions was to avert a disorderly failure of these 
institutions and so to limit the impact of the firms’ difficulties on the functioning of 
financial markets and the broader economy.”). 
 302. See Walker, supra note 17, at 718-21. 
2017]     THE COSTS OF BAILOUTS IN THE 467 
                                     2007-08 FINANCIAL CRISIS 
prescribes the central bank to lend to “anyone” and “all,” so long as they 
are solvent firms, rather than limiting the lending to where “broad-based 
eligibility” can be established. 303  It would be a distorted reading of 
Bagehot’s dictum to favor a central bank’s lending to programs with 
broad-based eligibility and discriminating against individual 
institutions.304 Because both Bear Stearns and AIG were illiquid but not 
insolvent,305 and the loans to both firms were charged high interest rates, 
the lending was consistent with Bagehot’s dictum.306 In identifying the 
loans to Bear Stearns and AIG as the motivation for the “broad-based 
eligibility” restriction, Dodd-Frank has unwisely denied the well-founded 
legitimacy of those two programs. By making the Fed’s lending to 
individual institutions impossible in the future, Dodd-Frank unwisely 
constrains the central bank’s ability to lend freely in a crisis.307 
CONCLUSION 
The 2008 bailouts were an appropriate response, a good investment, 
and an effective solution to save the financial markets.308 The various 
bailout programs provided significant liquidity to the financial markets.309 
The timely injection of liquidity enabled the continuation of lending by 
																																																																																																																																
 303. See id. at 721. 
 304. See id. at 720-21 (“[I]t would be incorrect to conclude that a ‘Bagehot-type 
activity’ involves LOLR funding only to the financial system at large and not to a single 
troubled, but solvent, institution.”). 
 305. See WILLIAM R. CLINE & JOSEPH E. GAGNON, LEHMAN DIED, BAGEHOT LIVES: 
WHY DID THE FED AND TREASURY LET A MAJOR WALL STREET BANK FAIL? 5 (2013), 
https://www.piie.com/publications/pb/pb13-21.pdf [https://perma.cc/79WT-7Y93] 
(“Overall, it appears that Bear Stearns was solvent at the time of its emergency loan, but 
its capital had been eroded by more than 90 percent and its shareholders took a large 
loss.”); Walker, supra note 17, at 718 (arguing that the Fed’s Section 13(3) actions in the 
cases of Bear Stearns and AIG met the solvency, collateral, and penalty rate requirements 
set out by Bagehot); Letter from Bernanke, supra note 301, at 13 (arguing that AIG’s 
problems appeared at the time to be more classical liquidity needs and could be covered 
with borrowings secured by valuable collateral). 
 306. See BERNANKE, supra note 272, at 281 (“Unlike Lehman, AIG appeared to have 
sufficiently valuable assets . . . to serve as collateral and to meet the legal requirement 
that the loan to be ‘secured to the satisfaction’ of the lending Reserve Bank.”). 
 307. See Walker, supra note 17, at 738 n.155. 
 308. See generally Madigan, supra note 6 (arguing that the 2008 bailouts were 
appropriate and effective). 
 309. See id. 
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financial institutions, thereby sustaining normal financial activities.310 By 
stabilizing the financial markets, the bailout programs effectively 
prevented systemic risk, therefore preserving the potential of the entire 
economy.311 In creating those programs, the federal government followed 
Bagehot’s dictum, with necessary innovations.312 In applying Bagehot’s 
dictum in the real world, both the presence of gray areas and the need for 
practical considerations rendered the strict application of such a dictum 
extremely challenging, if not impossible.313 The constant development of 
financial markets requires a compatible regulatory system to incorporate 
eligible innovations into the definition of standard central bank 
mechanisms.314 Given the effectiveness and legitimacy of the 2007-08 
bailouts, the curtailment of bailouts by Dodd-Frank appears to be an 
overhasty decision. The 2007-08 bailouts evince the government’s, and 
especially the Fed’s, ability to respond to a crisis with wisdom and 
flexibility. The preservation of such flexibility essentially relies on 
preserving the Fed’s independence in the exercise of its lending 
authorities. These reflections counsel reconsideration of Dodd-Frank’s 
anti-bailout provisions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																																																																																																
 310. See id. 
 311. See id. 
 312. See generally id. (arguing the necessity of the creation of unconventional lending 
facilities, such as the PDCF and the TSLF, as the modern structure of financial industry 
requires rapid injection of liquidity through multiple channels, which the traditional way 
of lending will not be able to achieve). 
 313. See id. 
 314. See id. 
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APPENDIX 1: PRIMARY CREDITS WITH FED FUND RATE COMPARISON 
Observing 
Date 
Primary 
Credit 
(Millions 
of dollars) 
Primary 
Rate (%) 
Gain/Loss(in 
dollars) 
Fed Fund 
Rate 
Dates 
Fed 
Fund 
Rate 
(%) 
08-15-07 11 5.75 1,732.88 08-01-07 5.02 
08-22-07 1,200.00 5.75 189,041.10 08-01-07 5.02 
08-29-07 1,315.00 5.75 207,157.53 08-01-07 5.02 
09-05-07 1,103.00 5.75 173,760.27 09-01-07 4.94 
09-12-07 2,932.00 5.75 461,890.41 09-01-07 4.94 
09-19-07 2,179.00 5.25 313,417.81 09-01-07 4.94 
09-26-07 88 5.25 12,657.53 09-01-07 4.94 
10-03-07 27 5.25 3,883.56 10-01-07 4.76 
10-10-07 113 5.25 16,253.42 10-01-07 4.76 
10-17-07 126 5.25 18,123.29 10-01-07 4.76 
10-24-07 142 5.25 20,424.66 10-01-07 4.76 
10-31-07 190 5.25 27,328.77 10-01-07 4.76 
11-07-07 191 5.00 26,164.38 11-01-07 4.49 
11-14-07 523 5.00 71,643.84 11-01-07 4.49 
11-21-07 434 5.00 59,452.05 11-01-07 4.49 
11-28-07 7 5.00 958.9 11-01-07 4.49 
12-05-07 309 5.00 42,328.77 12-01-07 4.24 
12-12-07 3,009.00 5.00 412,191.78 12-01-07 4.24 
12-19-07 4,586.00 4.75 596,808.22 12-01-07 4.24 
12-26-07 4,802.00 4.75 624,917.81 12-01-07 4.24 
01-02-08 5,770.00 4.75 750,890.41 01-01-08 3.94 
01-09-08 1,512.00 4.75 196,767.12 01-01-08 3.94 
01-16-08 1,230.00 4.75 160,068.49 01-01-08 3.94 
01-23-08 744 4.00 81,534.25 01-01-08 3.94 
01-30-08 25 3.50 2,397.26 01-01-08 3.94 
02-06-08 144 3.50 13,808.22 02-01-08 2.98 
02-13-08 57 3.50 5,465.75 02-01-08 2.98 
02-20-08 220 3.50 21,095.89 02-01-08 2.98 
02-27-08 169 3.50 16,205.48 02-01-08 2.98 
03-05-08 355 3.50 34,041.10 03-01-08 2.61 
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03-12-08 99 3.50 9,493.15 03-01-08 2.61 
03-19-08 81 3.25 7,212.33 03-01-08 2.61 
03-26-08 550 2.50 37,671.23 03-01-08 2.61 
04-02-08 7,013.00 2.50 480,342.47 04-01-08 2.28 
04-09-08 10,182.00 2.50 697,397.26 04-01-08 2.28 
04-16-08 7,841.00 2.50 537,054.79 04-01-08 2.28 
04-23-08 10,731.00 2.50 735,000.00 04-01-08 2.28 
04-30-08 11,588.00 2.50 793,698.63 04-01-08 2.28 
05-07-08 11,655.00 2.25 718,458.90 05-01-08 1.98 
05-14-08 14,416.00 2.25 888,657.53 05-01-08 1.98 
05-21-08 13,536.00 2.25 834,410.96 05-01-08 1.98 
05-28-08 15,950.00 2.25 983,219.18 05-01-08 1.98 
06-04-08 15,921.00 2.25 981,431.51 06-01-08 2.00 
06-11-08 13,148.00 2.25 810,493.15 06-01-08 2.00 
06-18-08 13,371.00 2.25 824,239.73 06-01-08 2.00 
06-25-08 14,702.00 2.25 906,287.67 06-01-08 2.00 
07-02-08 14,861.00 2.25 916,089.04 07-01-08 2.01 
07-09-08 12,856.00 2.25 792,493.15 07-01-08 2.01 
07-16-08 13,916.00 2.25 857,835.62 07-01-08 2.01 
07-23-08 16,381.00 2.25 1,009,787.67 07-01-08 2.01 
07-30-08 17,452.00 2.25 1,075,808.22 07-01-08 2.01 
08-06-08 17,370.00 2.25 1,070,753.42 08-01-08 2.00 
08-13-08 17,699.00 2.25 1,091,034.25 08-01-08 2.00 
08-20-08 17,513.00 2.25 1,079,568.49 08-01-08 2.00 
08-27-08 18,469.00 2.25 1,138,500.00 08-01-08 2.00 
09-03-08 18,976.00 2.25 1,169,753.42 09-01-08 1.81 
09-10-08 19,796.00 2.25 1,220,301.37 09-01-08 1.81 
09-17-08 21,598.00 2.25 1,331,383.56 09-01-08 1.81 
09-24-08 39,357.00 2.25 2,426,116.44 09-01-08 1.81 
10-01-08 44,463.00 2.25 2,740,869.86 10-01-08 0.97 
10-08-08 75,010.00 1.75 3,596,369.86 10-01-08 0.97 
10-15-08 99,659.00 1.75 4,778,171.23 10-01-08 0.97 
10-22-08 105,754.00 1.75 5,070,397.26 10-01-08 0.97 
10-29-08 111,946.00 1.25 3,833,767.12 10-01-08 0.97 
11-05-08 109,994.00 1.25 3,766,917.81 11-01-08 0.39 
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11-12-08 95,380.00 1.25 3,266,438.36 11-01-08 0.39 
11-19-08 91,552.00 1.25 3,135,342.47 11-01-08 0.39 
11-26-08 93,628.00 1.25 3,206,438.36 11-01-08 0.39 
12-03-08 90,333.00 1.25 3,093,595.89 12-01-08 0.16 
12-10-08 90,161.00 1.25 3,087,705.48 12-01-08 0.16 
12-17-08 88,407.00 0.50 1,211,054.79 12-01-08 0.16 
12-24-08 86,260.00 0.50 1,181,643.84 12-01-08 0.16 
12-31-08 86,550.00 0.50 1,185,616.44 12-01-08 0.16 
01-07-09 87,935.00 0.50 1,204,589.04 01-01-09 0.15 
01-14-09 69,101.00 0.50 946,589.04 01-01-09 0.15 
01-21-09 61,618.00 0.50 844,082.19 01-01-09 0.15 
01-28-09 64,990.00 0.50 890,273.97 01-01-09 0.15 
02-04-09 67,426.00 0.50 923,643.84 02-01-09 0.22 
02-11-09 64,574.00 0.50 884,575.34 02-01-09 0.22 
02-18-09 65,992.00 0.50 904,000.00 02-01-09 0.22 
02-25-09 64,408.00 0.50 882,301.37 02-01-09 0.22 
03-04-09 65,961.00 0.50 903,575.34 03-01-09 0.18 
03-11-09 63,487.00 0.50 869,684.93 03-01-09 0.18 
03-18-09 65,683.00 0.50 899,767.12 03-01-09 0.18 
03-25-09 62,782.00 0.50 860,027.40 03-01-09 0.18 
04-01-09 59,735.00 0.50 818,287.67 04-01-09 0.15 
04-08-09 49,159.00 0.50 673,410.96 04-01-09 0.15 
04-15-09 48,490.00 0.50 664,246.58 04-01-09 0.15 
04-22-09 43,112.00 0.50 590,575.34 04-01-09 0.15 
04-29-09 44,788.00 0.50 613,534.25 04-01-09 0.15 
05-06-09 40,941.00 0.50 560,835.62 05-01-09 0.18 
05-13-09 39,872.00 0.50 546,191.78 05-01-09 0.18 
05-20-09 38,155.00 0.50 522,671.23 05-01-09 0.18 
05-27-09 38,153.00 0.50 522,643.84 05-01-09 0.18 
06-03-09 41,930.00 0.50 574,383.56 06-01-09 0.21 
06-10-09 36,874.00 0.50 505,123.29 06-01-09 0.21 
06-17-09 36,182.00 0.50 495,643.84 06-01-09 0.21 
06-24-09 39,095.00 0.50 535,547.95 06-01-09 0.21 
07-01-09 35,910.00 0.50 491,917.81 07-01-09 0.16 
07-08-09 34,966.00 0.50 478,986.30 07-01-09 0.16 
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07-15-09 34,457.00 0.50 472,013.70 07-01-09 0.16 
07-22-09 33,748.00 0.50 462,301.37 07-01-09 0.16 
07-29-09 33,803.00 0.50 463,054.79 07-01-09 0.16 
08-05-09 35,090.00 0.50 480,684.93 08-01-09 0.16 
08-12-09 33,934.00 0.50 464,849.32 08-01-09 0.16 
08-19-09 30,711.00 0.50 420,698.63 08-01-09 0.16 
08-26-09 29,981.00 0.50 410,698.63 08-01-09 0.16 
09-02-09 32,659.00 0.50 447,383.56 09-01-09 0.15 
09-09-09 30,374.00 0.50 416,082.19 09-01-09 0.15 
09-16-09 28,681.00 0.50 392,890.41 09-01-09 0.15 
09-23-09 28,186.00 0.50 386,109.59 09-01-09 0.15 
09-30-09 27,977.00 0.50 383,246.58 09-01-09 0.15 
10-07-09 27,898.00 0.50 382,164.38 10-01-09 0.12 
10-14-09 27,380.00 0.50 375,068.49 10-01-09 0.12 
10-21-09 23,840.00 0.50 326,575.34 10-01-09 0.12 
10-28-09 22,578.00 0.50 309,287.67 10-01-09 0.12 
11-04-09 22,610.00 0.50 309,726.03 11-01-09 0.12 
11-11-09 20,799.00 0.50 284,917.81 11-01-09 0.12 
11-18-09 19,793.00 0.50 271,136.99 11-01-09 0.12 
11-25-09 19,932.00 0.50 273,041.10 11-01-09 0.12 
12-02-09 19,818.00 0.50 271,479.45 12-01-09 0.12 
12-09-09 19,350.00 0.50 265,068.49 12-01-09 0.12 
12-16-09 19,093.00 0.50 261,547.95 12-01-09 0.12 
12-23-09 18,749.00 0.50 256,835.62 12-01-09 0.12 
12-30-09 18,743.00 0.50 256,753.42 12-01-09 0.12 
01-06-10 19,453.00 0.50 266,479.45 01-01-10 0.11 
01-13-10 17,500.00 0.50 239,726.03 01-01-10 0.11 
01-20-10 15,112.00 0.50 207,013.70 01-01-10 0.11 
01-27-10 14,855.00 0.50 203,493.15 01-01-10 0.11 
02-03-10 14,767.00 0.50 202,287.67 02-01-10 0.13 
02-10-10 14,562.00 0.50 199,479.45 02-01-10 0.13 
02-17-10 14,263.00 0.50 195,383.56 02-01-10 0.13 
02-24-10 13,960.00 0.75 286,849.32 02-01-10 0.13 
03-03-10 13,773.00 0.75 283,006.85 03-01-10 0.16 
03-10-10 13,730.00 0.75 282,123.29 03-01-10 0.16 
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03-17-10 11,489.00 0.75 236,075.34 03-01-10 0.16 
03-24-10 10,750.00 0.75 220,890.41 03-01-10 0.16 
03-31-10 7,664.00 0.75 157,479.45 03-01-10 0.16 
04-07-10 7,205.00 0.75 148,047.95 04-01-10 0.20 
04-14-10 6,770.00 0.75 139,109.59 04-01-10 0.20 
04-21-10 6,227.00 0.75 127,952.05 04-01-10 0.20 
04-28-10 5,990.00 0.75 123,082.19 04-01-10 0.20 
05-05-10 5,347.00 0.75 109,869.86 05-01-10 0.20 
05-12-10 5,150.00 0.75 105,821.92 05-01-10 0.20 
05-19-10 5,114.00 0.75 105,082.19 05-01-10 0.20 
05-26-10 4,315.00 0.75 88,664.38 05-01-10 0.20 
06-02-10 678 0.75 13,931.51 06-01-10 0.18 
06-09-10 105 0.75 2,157.53 06-01-10 0.18 
06-16-10 104 0.75 2,136.99 06-01-10 0.18 
06-23-10 151 0.75 3,102.74 06-01-10 0.18 
06-30-10 162 0.75 3,328.77 06-01-10 0.18 
07-07-10 41 0.75 842.47 07-01-10 0.18 
07-14-10 86 0.75 1,767.12 07-01-10 0.18 
07-21-10 25 0.75 513.7 07-01-10 0.18 
07-28-10 11 0.75 226.03 07-01-10 0.18 
08-04-10 36 0.75 739.73 08-01-10 0.19 
08-11-10 14 0.75 287.67 08-01-10 0.19 
08-18-10 12 0.75 246.58 08-01-10 0.19 
08-25-10 28 0.75 575.34 08-01-10 0.19 
09-01-10 13 0.75 267.12 09-01-10 0.19 
09-08-10 29 0.75 595.89 09-01-10 0.19 
09-15-10 29 0.75 595.89 09-01-10 0.19 
09-22-10 20 0.75 410.96 09-01-10 0.19 
09-29-10 25 0.75 513.7 09-01-10 0.19 
10-06-10 89 0.75 1,828.77 10-01-10 0.19 
10-13-10 15 0.75 308.22 10-01-10 0.19 
10-20-10 32 0.75 657.53 10-01-10 0.19 
10-27-10 24 0.75 493.15 10-01-10 0.19 
11-03-10 64 0.75 1,315.07 11-01-10 0.19 
11-10-10 13 0.75 267.12 11-01-10 0.19 
474 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
11-17-10 25 0.75 513.7 11-01-10 0.19 
11-24-10 158 0.75 3,246.58 11-01-10 0.19 
12-01-10 191 0.75 3,924.66 12-01-10 0.18 
12-08-10 38 0.75 780.82 12-01-10 0.18 
12-15-10 22 0.75 452.05 12-01-10 0.18 
12-22-10 28 0.75 575.34 12-01-10 0.18 
12-29-10 52 0.75 1,068.49 12-01-10 0.18 
Sum      105,767,547.95     
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APPENDIX 2: MBS FED DATA 
First 
Settle 
Date 
Purchase 
Price 
Interest 
(%) 
Number 
of Days 
Last 
Price 
Interest 
Amount 
Mark to 
Market 
PNL 
08-13-09 101.17 5.00 2643.00 110.2031 90.5137 22.32165 
07-16-09 97.17 3.50 2671.00 105.83 38.41849 13.36543 
05-12-09 97.82 3.50 2736.00 105.08 91.82466 25.96957 
06-11-09 97.56 3.50 2706.00 105.23 -90.8178 -27.5321 
07-13-09 96.81 3.50 2674.00 105.52 10.76926 3.776844 
08-13-09 91.50 3.50 2643.00 105.48 50.68767 30.56694 
01-19-10 102.36 4.00 2484.00 103.44 394.7178 15.30892 
02-18-09 102.26 4.00 2819.00 103.41 393.8877 14.35353 
03-17-09 101.61 4.00 2792.00 104.02 757.2822 58.59583 
04-16-09 100.77 4.00 2762.00 104.11 544.8329 59.64945 
05-18-09 101.26 4.00 2730.00 103.86 747.9452 64.17576 
06-16-09 101.08 4.00 2701.00 103.83 355.2 32.62515 
07-16-09 100.96 4.00 2671.00 103.42 819.5945 68.27704 
08-18-09 100.63 4.00 2638.00 103.14 650.4658 56.13541 
10-19-09 101.09 4.00 2576.00 103.61 614.0055 54.17077 
11-17-09 101.78 4.00 2547.00 103.50 495.4438 29.93247 
12-17-09 101.09 4.00 2517.00 103.46 413.7534 35.19203 
02-12-09 100.91 4.00 2825.00 108.15 62.97041 14.589 
03-12-09 99.20 4.00 2797.00 100.00 91.95616 2.419355 
04-13-09 99.92 4.00 2765.00 100.00 60.60274 0.160128 
07-13-09 99.01 4.00 2674.00 100.00 58.60822 1.999798 
08-18-09 98.34 4.00 2638.00 100.00 43.36438 2.532032 
01-13-09 101.28 4.00 2855.00 106.92 735.2603 130.867 
02-12-09 100.64 4.00 2825.00 106.85 866.8493 172.9067 
03-12-09 100.34 4.00 2797.00 106.52 4061.397 815.4976 
04-13-09 100.12 4.00 2765.00 106.86 6615.94 1469.698 
05-12-09 98.77 4.00 2736.00 107.05 3071.216 858.3581 
06-11-09 99.91 4.00 2706.00 107.27 6605.605 1639.941 
07-13-09 99.32 4.00 2674.00 107.11 6036.647 1615.597 
08-13-09 99.37 4.00 2643.00 107.17 1144.093 310.1279 
10-14-09 99.75 4.00 2581.00 107.13 84.85479 22.18655 
11-12-09 98.49 4.00 2552.00 107.15 559.3425 175.8046 
12-14-09 98.03 4.00 2520.00 107.05 338.3014 112.7565 
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01-19-10 103.91 4.50 2484.00 103.64 459.3699 -3.88858 
02-18-09 102.55 4.50 2819.00 103.14 512.6332 8.495094 
03-17-09 101.76 4.50 2792.00 102.77 903.5753 25.94109 
04-16-09 101.61 4.50 2762.00 103.08 22.13384 0.939161 
05-18-09 102.58 4.50 2730.00 102.86 -50.4863 -0.40852 
06-16-09 100.66 4.50 2701.00 102.67 249.75 14.99013 
07-16-09 100.33 4.50 2671.00 102.67 -62.5673 -4.43493 
08-18-09 100.56 4.50 2638.00 102.67 292.7096 18.90103 
09-17-09 101.61 4.50 2608.00 102.67 366.549 11.91357 
10-19-09 102.80 4.50 2576.00 102.67 508.1425 -1.99416 
11-17-09 103.66 4.50 2547.00 102.67 368.9661 -11.2005 
12-17-09 103.47 4.50 2517.00 102.67 736.9983 -18.3198 
07-13-09 100.52 4.50 2674.00 100.00 115.3849 -1.81058 
08-13-09 101.14 4.50 2643.00 100.00 32.58493 -1.12715 
09-14-09 100.63 4.50 2611.00 100.00 32.19041 -0.62606 
01-13-09 102.63 4.50 2855.00 109.19 3687.057 669.0613 
02-12-09 101.14 4.50 2825.00 109.17 4466.789 1018.697 
03-12-09 101.70 4.50 2797.00 108.58 15802.09 3099.214 
04-13-09 100.76 4.50 2765.00 108.58 11223.82 2554.702 
05-12-09 100.37 4.50 2736.00 108.58 8829.222 2140.557 
06-11-09 101.48 4.50 2706.00 109.27 19249.67 4426.789 
07-13-09 101.15 4.50 2674.00 109.27 10994.54 2675.789 
08-13-09 100.72 4.50 2643.00 109.27 7062.784 1839.023 
09-14-09 99.73 4.50 2611.00 109.27 2655.709 788.8189 
10-14-09 98.46 4.50 2581.00 109.33 5162.884 1791.16 
11-12-09 100.25 4.50 2552.00 109.36 3036.181 876.4902 
12-14-09 100.04 4.50 2520.00 109.28 2252.466 669.9174 
03-17-09 102.33 5.00 2792.00 102.36 66.93151 0.050236 
04-16-09 103.08 5.00 2762.00 102.11 -52.9699 1.318272 
06-16-09 102.24 5.00 2701.00 102.64 37 0.391848 
07-16-09 101.94 5.00 2671.00 102.33 -31.1007 -0.32363 
01-13-09 103.05 5.00 2855.00 110.51 5684.97 1052.989 
02-12-09 102.92 5.00 2825.00 110.45 3294.801 623.0366 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 110.67 4038.293 898.311 
04-13-09 101.41 5.00 2765.00 110.67 5044.042 1216.255 
05-12-09 102.72 5.00 2736.00 110.67 8904.743 1839.258 
06-11-09 103.08 5.00 2706.00 110.67 -7263.57 -1443.18 
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07-13-09 102.09 5.00 2674.00 110.67 659.3425 151.3113 
08-13-09 102.04 5.00 2643.00 110.67 5286 1235.059 
09-14-09 100.34 5.00 2611.00 110.67 6346.518 1827.076 
10-14-09 100.92 5.00 2581.00 110.78 6901.17 1906.744 
11-12-09 102.10 5.00 2552.00 110.71 4791.467 1156.031 
12-14-09 102.81 5.00 2520.00 110.64 2804.795 618.8812 
01-27-09 103.63 5.50 2841.00 112.49 5450.132 1088.546 
02-12-09 103.27 5.50 2825.00 112.54 7908.375 1667.329 
03-12-09 102.52 5.50 2797.00 112.54 12876.62 2985.532 
04-13-09 102.29 5.50 2765.00 112.54 12571.56 3023.01 
05-12-09 102.70 5.50 2736.00 112.36 2892.102 659.7908 
06-11-09 103.83 5.50 2706.00 112.36 -10293.7 -2073.81 
07-13-09 103.35 5.50 2674.00 112.36 -2367.22 -512.144 
08-13-09 102.96 5.50 2643.00 112.36 -3345.39 -766.849 
09-14-09 102.84 5.50 2611.00 112.36 6560.585 1543.52 
10-14-09 102.69 5.50 2581.00 112.81 6154.624 1559.538 
11-12-09 103.90 5.50 2552.00 112.68 10223.21 2247.213 
12-14-09 103.89 5.50 2520.00 112.58 2293.545 505.5059 
01-13-09 103.80 6.00 2855.00 114.51 1935.925 425.5572 
02-12-09 102.90 6.00 2825.00 114.57 3109.141 759.3639 
03-12-09 103.27 6.00 2797.00 114.57 8748.342 2082.146 
04-13-09 103.19 6.00 2765.00 114.57 2318.055 562.4793 
05-12-09 103.22 6.00 2736.00 114.57 -6127.89 -1498.31 
06-11-09 104.63 6.00 2706.00 114.57 -2586.64 -552.48 
07-13-09 104.08 6.00 2674.00 114.57 -17.5825 -4.03183 
08-13-09 104.77 6.00 2643.00 114.57 -82.5485 -17.7738 
09-14-09 105.58 6.00 2611.00 114.57 -42.9205 -8.51566 
10-14-09 105.19 6.00 2581.00 114.68 0 0 
11-12-09 105.41 6.00 2552.00 114.68 41.95068 8.790954 
12-14-09 105.53 6.00 2520.00 114.62 2381.918 495.0522 
02-12-09 103.78 6.50 2825.00 114.62 580.1041 120.3957 
04-13-09 103.59 6.50 2765.00 114.62 46.77774 10.11143 
05-12-09 105.38 6.50 2736.00 114.62 -24.3616 -4.3821 
06-11-09 105.63 6.50 2706.00 114.62 0 0 
07-13-09 106.44 6.50 2674.00 114.62 216.6673 34.9488 
08-13-09 106.88 6.50 2643.00 114.62 -94.1342 -14.4755 
09-14-09 106.41 6.50 2611.00 114.62 0 0 
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10-14-09 106.67 6.50 2581.00 114.62 0 0 
11-12-09 106.58 6.50 2552.00 114.62 0 0 
12-14-09 106.92 6.50 2520.00 114.62 89.75342 14.39528 
02-18-10 96.94 4.00 2454.00 107.00 53.7863 20.74566 
03-18-09 100.67 4.00 2791.00 107.00 30.5863 6.283324 
04-20-09 99.38 4.00 2758.00 107.00 60.44932 15.32587 
05-19-09 99.96 4.00 2729.00 107.00 134.5808 31.67207 
06-18-09 99.80 4.00 2699.00 107.00 133.1014 32.44429 
07-20-09 99.03 4.00 2667.00 107.36 657.6164 189.2466 
08-20-09 99.16 4.00 2636.00 107.36 346.6521 99.226 
09-21-09 97.41 4.00 2604.00 107.36 57.07397 20.42783 
01-21-10 101.59 4.50 2482.00 109.84 1294.38 343.4428 
03-18-09 100.63 4.50 2791.00 108.48 1049.492 238.0587 
04-20-09 100.64 4.50 2758.00 108.48 2091.168 479.3612 
05-19-09 100.12 4.50 2729.00 108.48 1177.582 292.4022 
06-18-09 101.56 4.50 2699.00 108.48 1331.014 272.7206 
07-20-09 101.18 4.50 2667.00 108.48 1537.178 337.4971 
08-20-09 101.11 4.50 2636.00 110.33 2112.411 592.6145 
09-21-09 100.34 4.50 2604.00 110.33 898.9151 278.726 
10-21-09 101.02 4.50 2574.00 110.33 1039.297 301.7703 
11-19-09 100.70 4.50 2545.00 110.15 376.5205 112.6006 
12-21-09 100.54 4.50 2513.00 110.00 1679.235 509.7642 
01-21-10 104.11 5.00 2482.00 110.56 629 114.5781 
02-19-09 102.45 5.00 2818.00 110.53 1910.836 390.2946 
03-18-09 102.13 5.00 2791.00 110.53 951.9986 204.747 
04-20-09 101.48 5.00 2758.00 110.53 324.9151 76.67725 
05-19-09 101.42 5.00 2729.00 110.53 93.4589 22.45099 
06-18-09 103.66 5.00 2699.00 110.53 92.43151 16.56356 
08-20-09 101.52 5.00 2636.00 110.53 324.9863 79.85741 
09-21-09 102.06 5.00 2604.00 110.53 267.5342 62.22748 
10-21-09 102.61 5.00 2574.00 111.05 1621.973 378.3378 
11-19-09 103.19 5.00 2545.00 110.80 2422.979 512.8307 
12-21-09 103.98 5.00 2513.00 110.67 1204.863 225.2047 
01-21-10 105.56 5.50 2482.00 112.62 46.75 8.359446 
02-19-09 102.77 5.50 2818.00 112.61 658.1767 148.3474 
03-18-09 102.56 5.50 2791.00 112.61 399.5336 93.05398 
04-20-09 102.80 5.50 2758.00 112.61 -166.236 -38.1553 
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05-19-09 104.38 5.50 2729.00 111.77 -92.5243 -15.9203 
06-18-09 103.94 5.50 2699.00 111.77 538.8757 99.75903 
07-20-09 103.69 5.50 2667.00 112.83 -481.649 -105.661 
09-21-09 104.77 5.50 2604.00 112.83 -137.334 -26.9304 
10-21-09 104.38 5.50 2574.00 112.83 135.7521 28.33874 
11-19-09 106.34 5.50 2545.00 112.87 -162.985 -26.0878 
12-21-09 105.95 5.50 2513.00 112.79 113.6014 19.35361 
01-21-09 103.94 6.00 2847.00 112.79 93.6 17.01953 
02-19-09 102.98 6.00 2818.00 112.79 185.2932 38.08526 
03-18-09 103.73 6.00 2791.00 112.79 1307.564 248.7891 
04-20-09 103.47 6.00 2758.00 112.79 249.3534 49.51461 
05-19-09 104.73 6.00 2729.00 112.79 -1312.16 -224.969 
06-18-09 104.61 6.00 2699.00 112.79 303.9148 53.5313 
07-20-09 103.19 6.00 2667.00 114.98 -298.119 -77.7224 
08-20-09 104.52 6.00 2636.00 114.98 -51.9978 -12.0142 
02-18-09 101.36 4.00 2819.00 102.82 188.4482 8.802113 
03-17-09 100.46 4.00 2792.00 103.33 667.0203 62.18072 
04-16-09 99.81 4.00 2762.00 103.33 270.903 31.52315 
05-18-09 100.55 4.00 2730.00 103.33 -254.301 -23.4623 
06-16-09 101.02 4.00 2701.00 103.33 14.8 1.141084 
07-16-09 98.52 4.00 2671.00 103.33 321.9836 53.654 
09-17-09 100.13 4.00 2608.00 103.33 42.87123 4.786948 
10-19-09 100.92 4.00 2576.00 103.33 21.1726 1.787639 
11-17-09 101.23 4.00 2547.00 103.28 83.73699 6.07726 
01-13-10 98.83 4.00 2490.00 106.80 136.4384 40.33938 
02-12-09 100.73 4.00 2825.00 106.74 1145.479 220.6684 
03-12-09 99.03 4.00 2797.00 106.74 2774.317 704.4433 
04-13-09 98.52 4.00 2765.00 106.74 4224.314 1162.818 
05-12-09 98.76 4.00 2736.00 106.74 2543.506 685.2323 
06-11-09 98.44 4.00 2706.00 106.74 2639.277 750.1847 
07-13-09 99.30 4.00 2674.00 106.74 1201.468 307.0891 
08-13-09 99.09 4.00 2643.00 106.74 1795.792 478.5024 
12-14-09 99.22 4.00 2520.00 106.93 158.7945 44.66346 
02-18-09 102.92 4.50 2819.00 102.82 286.7271 -0.7808 
03-16-10 103.81 4.50 2428.00 102.82 127.2205 -4.04246 
04-16-09 101.88 4.50 2762.00 102.82 102.1562 2.7756 
05-18-09 103.00 4.50 2730.00 102.82 -33.6575 0.172239 
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06-16-09 102.66 4.50 2701.00 102.82 33.3 0.158381 
10-19-09 102.76 4.50 2576.00 102.48 381.1068 -3.21866 
11-17-09 103.77 4.50 2547.00 102.48 78.50342 -3.09729 
02-12-09 100.67 4.50 2825.00 109.63 34.82877 8.90135 
01-13-09 102.42 4.50 2855.00 109.16 3775.053 705.3084 
02-12-09 102.22 4.50 2825.00 109.14 7131.19 1386.856 
03-12-09 100.56 4.50 2797.00 109.14 14138.26 3499.753 
04-13-09 100.72 4.50 2765.00 109.14 13253.14 3251.587 
05-12-09 100.65 4.50 2736.00 109.11 7072.485 1762.223 
06-11-09 100.37 4.50 2706.00 109.11 6478.398 1690.817 
07-13-09 101.02 4.50 2674.00 109.11 8456.067 2053.974 
08-13-09 100.75 4.50 2643.00 109.11 7844.822 1997.538 
09-14-09 99.04 4.50 2611.00 109.11 2229.186 704.0632 
10-14-09 98.64 4.50 2581.00 109.30 461.3979 156.6933 
11-12-09 100.42 4.50 2552.00 109.34 464.0795 130.9743 
12-14-09 100.32 4.50 2520.00 109.26 1972.849 565.7755 
02-18-09 103.32 5.00 2819.00 102.80 77.23288 -1.01263 
09-17-09 104.72 5.00 2608.00 102.80 -25.0082 1.285511 
10-19-09 104.27 5.00 2576.00 102.80 0 0 
11-17-09 105.09 5.00 2547.00 102.80 0 0 
12-17-09 105.48 5.00 2517.00 102.80 24.13562 -1.78061 
01-13-09 103.44 5.00 2855.00 102.80 97.65664 -1.55248 
01-13-09 102.63 5.00 2855.00 110.45 5954.435 1159.505 
02-12-09 101.59 5.00 2825.00 110.45 6685.188 1507.237 
03-12-09 101.61 5.00 2797.00 110.45 9205.195 2091.031 
04-13-09 101.27 5.00 2765.00 109.83 1306.747 291.5526 
05-12-09 102.58 5.00 2736.00 109.83 -1611.62 -303.831 
06-17-09 101.63 5.00 2700.00 109.83 702.7397 153.2661 
07-13-09 101.25 5.00 2674.00 109.83 1172.164 271.1111 
08-13-09 100.86 5.00 2643.00 110.20 2208.534 565.071 
09-14-09 100.99 5.00 2611.00 109.83 4667.61 1142.069 
10-14-09 101.50 5.00 2581.00 110.70 6523.212 1673.071 
11-12-09 102.07 5.00 2552.00 110.60 7524.904 1798.362 
12-14-09 102.50 5.00 2520.00 110.50 3469.315 784.4434 
02-18-09 103.27 5.50 2819.00 103.83 42.47808 0.540452 
01-13-09 103.41 5.50 2855.00 112.26 1462.699 291.0021 
02-12-09 103.34 5.50 2825.00 112.30 2511.541 511.6157 
2017]     THE COSTS OF BAILOUTS IN THE 481 
                                     2007-08 FINANCIAL CRISIS 
03-12-09 102.11 5.50 2797.00 112.30 1124.766 266.3493 
04-13-09 102.35 5.50 2765.00 112.30 1874.897 437.5169 
05-12-09 103.33 5.50 2736.00 112.30 3906.296 822.6166 
06-11-09 103.34 5.50 2706.00 112.30 -3435.32 -730.57 
07-13-09 102.19 5.50 2674.00 112.30 -1988.47 -488.288 
08-13-09 103.29 5.50 2643.00 112.30 -159.304 -34.8962 
09-14-09 102.88 5.50 2611.00 112.30 236.063 54.94408 
11-12-09 104.38 5.50 2552.00 112.40 918.3005 183.4524 
12-14-09 104.24 5.50 2520.00 112.31 1466.502 298.9439 
01-13-09 103.86 6.00 2855.00 114.26 23.46575 5.00821 
02-12-09 104.05 6.00 2825.00 114.30 257.0363 54.50418 
03-12-09 103.60 6.00 2797.00 114.30 459.7808 103.2432 
04-13-09 103.34 6.00 2765.00 114.30 -193.171 -45.0581 
05-12-09 104.50 6.00 2736.00 114.30 1034.433 215.6057 
06-11-09 104.42 6.00 2706.00 114.30 -1223.26 -260.094 
09-14-09 105.76 6.00 2611.00 114.30 -72.9649 -13.7209 
10-14-09 105.38 6.00 2581.00 114.41 0 0 
11-12-09 105.52 6.00 2552.00 114.45 0 0 
12-14-09 105.97 6.00 2520.00 114.38 70.42192 13.48603 
03-12-09 104.09 6.50 2797.00 114.38 74.71438 14.82355 
04-13-09 104.11 6.50 2765.00 114.38 356.988 71.49413 
09-14-09 106.79 6.50 2611.00 114.38 -79.0453 -12.0771 
10-14-09 106.38 6.50 2581.00 115.14 0 0 
11-12-09 106.44 6.50 2552.00 115.14 0 0 
12-14-09 106.94 6.50 2520.00 115.14 76.29041 13.03634 
07-20-09 96.84 4.00 2667.00 106.89 58.45479 20.75718 
08-20-09 96.08 4.00 2636.00 106.89 166.1041 64.69722 
02-19-09 102.22 4.50 2818.00 107.94 17.37123 2.796746 
03-18-09 100.34 4.50 2791.00 107.33 447.3247 90.5378 
04-20-09 99.84 4.50 2758.00 107.36 136.011 30.1257 
05-19-09 99.98 4.50 2729.00 107.36 168.226 36.90426 
06-18-09 101.54 4.50 2699.00 107.08 615.5938 100.9014 
07-20-09 101.09 4.50 2667.00 106.80 2912.254 500.0078 
08-20-09 98.46 4.50 2636.00 107.45 1695.779 476.6009 
09-21-09 99.09 4.50 2604.00 107.61 842.7329 225.6873 
10-21-09 101.61 4.50 2574.00 107.89 238.0068 46.36479 
12-21-09 101.80 4.50 2513.00 107.95 557.6795 108.7126 
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02-18-10 103.95 5.00 2454.00 108.92 495.8425 70.54849 
03-18-10 103.53 5.00 2426.00 108.27 1329.315 182.9663 
04-20-09 101.28 5.00 2758.00 108.17 736.726 132.6931 
05-20-10 103.56 5.00 2363.00 107.95 64.73973 8.484212 
07-20-09 102.36 5.00 2667.00 108.64 -142.484 -23.9297 
08-20-09 100.68 5.00 2636.00 108.36 411.6493 86.95359 
09-21-09 101.30 5.00 2604.00 108.61 356.7123 72.15573 
02-12-09 102.77 5.50 2825.00 113.57 0.340548 0.084102 
02-12-09 102.23 5.00 2825.00 111.53 38.93082 9.149028 
02-12-09 102.95 5.00 2825.00 111.53 38.77603 8.348152 
03-12-09 101.79 5.00 2797.00 111.46 9.578767 2.373828 
03-12-09 102.20 5.00 2797.00 111.46 191.7286 45.31644 
03-12-09 102.06 5.00 2797.00 111.53 190.809 46.19537 
02-12-09 102.77 5.50 2825.00 113.37 2.937226 0.712014 
02-12-09 102.77 5.50 2825.00 113.37 0.212842 0.051595 
02-12-09 102.77 5.50 2825.00 113.37 0.468253 0.113509 
02-12-09 102.77 5.50 2825.00 113.37 18.81527 4.561016 
03-12-09 103.72 6.00 2797.00 114.98 101.5196 23.98002 
03-12-09 102.94 5.50 2797.00 113.01 42.14658 9.778449 
03-12-09 101.69 5.00 2797.00 111.46 38.31507 9.602986 
03-12-09 104.17 6.50 2797.00 116.41 133.9878 31.60822 
02-12-09 102.05 5.00 2825.00 111.44 442.1318 105.1735 
02-12-09 102.52 5.50 2825.00 113.37 33.58654 8.353978 
03-12-09 103.56 6.00 2797.00 115.47 133.5204 33.40999 
01-20-09 103.33 4.50 2848.00 106.21 9.023868 0.716944 
01-20-09 103.33 4.50 2848.00 106.15 10.8146 0.841218 
02-12-09 102.77 5.50 2825.00 113.37 0.085137 0.020638 
02-12-09 102.77 5.50 2825.00 113.37 0 0 
02-12-09 102.77 5.50 2825.00 113.37 0.042568 0.010319 
02-12-09 102.77 5.50 2825.00 113.14 2.55411 0.605315 
01-13-09 103.98 6.00 2855.00 114.99 18.20942 4.108753 
01-13-09 104.52 6.50 2855.00 110.88 7.21963 0.864205 
01-13-09 104.52 6.50 2855.00 100.00 4.880877 -0.41515 
01-13-09 103.98 6.00 2855.00 116.28 2.346575 0.591231 
04-30-09 101.69 4.50 2748.00 109.85 -81.3107 -19.2482 
02-12-09 102.77 5.50 2825.00 113.37 1.532466 0.371485 
02-12-09 102.77 5.50 2825.00 113.37 0.808801 0.196062 
2017]     THE COSTS OF BAILOUTS IN THE 483 
                                     2007-08 FINANCIAL CRISIS 
02-12-09 102.77 5.50 2825.00 113.37 3.746027 0.908076 
02-12-09 102.77 5.50 2825.00 113.37 1.70274 0.412762 
02-12-09 102.77 5.50 2825.00 113.37 0.638527 0.154786 
02-12-09 102.77 5.50 2825.00 113.37 0.255411 0.061914 
02-12-09 102.77 5.50 2825.00 113.37 2.25613 0.546909 
02-12-09 102.77 5.50 2825.00 113.37 0.979075 0.237338 
02-12-09 102.77 5.50 2825.00 113.37 1.575034 0.381804 
02-12-09 102.77 5.50 2825.00 113.37 0.383116 0.092871 
02-12-09 102.77 5.50 2825.00 113.37 3.320342 0.804885 
02-12-09 101.59 5.00 2825.00 111.46 14.58938 3.660999 
02-12-09 101.59 5.00 2825.00 111.46 26.43116 6.632527 
02-12-09 102.77 5.50 2825.00 113.37 0.085137 0.020638 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.15326 0.037028 
02-12-09 102.86 5.50 2825.00 113.34 0.042568 0.010186 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.59 1.798003 0.421825 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 1.241478 0.290895 
02-12-09 102.83 5.50 2825.00 113.57 1.915582 0.470168 
02-12-09 102.83 5.50 2825.00 113.57 0.297979 0.073137 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 5.193356 1.283943 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.05 0 0 
02-12-09 102.86 5.50 2825.00 113.05 0.638527 0.148616 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.10 0.07663 0.017885 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 0 0 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 14.44478 3.489886 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.268205 0.064799 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.07663 0.018514 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 0 0 
03-11-10 98.25 4.00 2433.00 107.85 -0.47993 -0.17581 
02-12-09 102.83 5.50 2825.00 113.57 1.745308 0.428375 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.41 5.36411 1.294469 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.41 0 0 
02-12-09 104.24 6.50 2825.00 116.80 120.8403 28.93418 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.10 -0.36205 -0.09028 
06-22-09 100.84 5.00 2695.00 111.22 -1.18137 -0.32924 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 1.447329 0.35782 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.05 0.297979 0.06801 
02-12-09 102.83 5.50 2825.00 113.57 3.320342 0.814957 
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02-12-09 102.83 5.50 2825.00 113.57 0.042568 0.010448 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 0.04281 0.010031 
02-12-09 102.86 5.50 2825.00 100.00 0.085137 -0.00556 
02-12-09 102.86 5.50 2825.00 100.00 0.042568 -0.00278 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 4.299418 1.062936 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 3.746027 0.926123 
02-12-09 102.86 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0.297979 0.075023 
02-12-09 102.86 5.50 2825.00 113.47 1.234486 0.299215 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 2.000719 0.494634 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0.808801 0.199958 
02-12-09 102.86 5.50 2825.00 113.59 2.979795 0.730001 
02-12-09 102.86 5.50 2825.00 113.36 0 0 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 100.00 0 0 
02-12-09 102.86 5.50 2825.00 113.59 0.085137 0.020857 
02-12-09 102.86 5.50 2825.00 113.59 0.170274 0.041714 
02-12-09 102.86 5.50 2825.00 113.59 2.639247 0.646572 
02-12-09 102.86 5.50 2825.00 113.59 0.042568 0.010429 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.88 0.256858 0.061988 
02-12-09 102.86 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0.212842 0.053588 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0.085137 0.021048 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0.085137 0.021048 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 1.106781 0.273627 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0.212842 0.052621 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0.255411 0.063145 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0.127705 0.031572 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 1.532466 0.378868 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0.042568 0.010524 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 100.00 0.042568 -0.00295 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0.042568 0.010524 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0.170274 0.042096 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0.170274 0.042096 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0.170274 0.042096 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0.638527 0.157862 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0.212842 0.052621 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0.595959 0.147338 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0 0 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0.212842 0.052621 
2017]     THE COSTS OF BAILOUTS IN THE 485 
                                     2007-08 FINANCIAL CRISIS 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0.170274 0.042096 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0.936507 0.231531 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0.042568 0.010524 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0.425685 0.105241 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0.170274 0.042096 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0 0 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0 0 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0.127705 0.031572 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0.468253 0.115765 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0.681096 0.168386 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0.85137 0.210482 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0.340548 0.084193 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0.383116 0.094717 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0.085137 0.021048 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0.042568 0.010524 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0.085137 0.021048 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0.85137 0.210482 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0 0 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0.127705 0.031572 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0.55339 0.136814 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0.510822 0.126289 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 1.106781 0.273627 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 1.660171 0.410441 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 1.362192 0.336772 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 4.001438 0.989268 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0 0 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 1.489897 0.368344 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0.212842 0.052621 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0.468253 0.115765 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0.085137 0.021048 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0.170274 0.042096 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 3.490616 0.862978 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0.127705 0.031572 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 4.639966 1.147129 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 5.704178 1.410232 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 2.213562 0.547254 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 4.044007 0.999792 
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02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0.255411 0.063145 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 3.150068 0.778785 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0.127705 0.031572 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 3.95887 0.978743 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 2.213562 0.547254 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0.723664 0.17891 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 1.40476 0.347296 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 1.362192 0.336772 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 1.021644 0.252579 
02-12-09 103.50 5.50 2825.00 113.88 203.222 47.89709 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.88 6.378629 1.539376 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0.936507 0.231531 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 2.043288 0.505158 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.88 1.669574 0.402924 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.88 0 0 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0.042568 0.010524 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.88 0.171238 0.041326 
02-12-09 102.86 5.50 2825.00 113.05 1.873014 0.43594 
01-13-09 103.73 5.50 2855.00 113.05 25.38212 5.301684 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0.127705 0.031572 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 1.660171 0.410441 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 5.959589 1.473377 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0.042568 0.010524 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0.042568 0.010524 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 1.830445 0.452537 
03-12-09 102.48 5.00 2797.00 111.49 64.17774 14.73024 
02-12-09 102.86 5.50 2825.00 113.05 3.1075 0.723263 
03-12-09 102.48 5.00 2797.00 111.49 42.83625 9.831889 
02-12-09 102.86 5.50 2825.00 113.05 2.25613 0.525109 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.05 4.880293 1.085781 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 100.00 0.085137 -0.0059 
02-12-09 101.87 5.00 2825.00 111.49 50.61781 12.35489 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.22989 0.055542 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.88 0.599334 0.144639 
01-13-09 103.69 5.50 2855.00 113.57 15.4874 3.431562 
03-12-09 102.48 5.00 2797.00 111.42 93.37382 21.26021 
03-12-09 101.97 5.00 2797.00 111.49 23.71703 5.780412 
2017]     THE COSTS OF BAILOUTS IN THE 487 
                                     2007-08 FINANCIAL CRISIS 
02-12-09 102.27 5.00 2825.00 111.42 32.54555 7.524578 
03-12-09 102.27 5.00 2797.00 111.49 189.6213 44.62797 
01-13-09 103.35 5.00 2855.00 111.49 195.6653 39.41537 
02-12-09 102.83 5.50 2825.00 113.57 0.936507 0.22986 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 9.042356 2.18465 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 5.394008 1.263888 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 1.532603 0.37028 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 1.830445 0.452537 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0.085137 0.021048 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 6.470411 1.599667 
03-12-09 102.15 5.00 2797.00 111.42 40.61397 9.619674 
02-12-09 102.83 5.50 2825.00 113.57 1.234486 0.302997 
02-12-09 102.83 5.50 2825.00 113.57 0.297979 0.073137 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 1.762493 0.425822 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.114945 0.027771 
02-12-09 101.92 5.00 2825.00 111.42 29.41096 7.084197 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 1.198668 0.280864 
02-12-09 102.86 5.50 2825.00 113.05 1.319623 0.307139 
02-12-09 102.83 5.50 2825.00 113.57 82.07205 20.14407 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.41 3.295096 0.795174 
03-12-09 102.48 5.00 2797.00 111.42 41.11207 9.360774 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 5.67063 1.370035 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.41 0.114945 0.027739 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.41 0 0 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.536411 0.129598 
02-12-09 102.73 5.50 2825.00 113.20 62.57568 14.98891 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 0.899001 0.210648 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.88 0.256858 0.061988 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 0.085137 0.021048 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 114.23 0.808801 0.206374 
02-12-09 102.86 5.50 2825.00 113.05 1.362192 0.317047 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 114.23 0.042568 0.010862 
02-12-09 102.86 5.50 2825.00 113.05 0 0 
02-12-09 102.86 5.50 2825.00 113.36 0.212842 0.051051 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.05 0.042568 0.009716 
02-12-09 102.86 5.50 2825.00 113.05 0 0 
02-12-09 102.83 5.50 2825.00 113.57 0.042568 0.010448 
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02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.36 0.85137 0.200355 
02-12-09 102.86 5.50 2825.00 113.05 0.127705 0.029723 
02-12-09 102.86 5.50 2825.00 113.05 0 0 
02-12-09 102.86 5.50 2825.00 113.05 0.085137 0.019815 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 0.470905 0.110339 
02-12-09 102.86 5.50 2825.00 113.36 0.255411 0.061262 
02-12-09 102.86 5.50 2825.00 113.36 0.170274 0.040841 
02-12-09 102.86 5.50 2825.00 113.05 0.297979 0.069354 
02-12-09 102.86 5.50 2825.00 100.00 0.212842 -0.0139 
02-12-09 102.86 5.50 2825.00 113.35 0.042568 0.010197 
02-12-09 102.86 5.50 2825.00 113.05 0.127705 0.029723 
02-12-09 102.86 5.50 2825.00 113.36 0.383116 0.091893 
02-12-09 102.86 5.50 2825.00 113.35 0.085137 0.020394 
02-12-09 102.86 5.50 2825.00 113.05 0.042568 0.009908 
02-12-09 102.86 5.50 2825.00 113.05 0 0 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.05 0.042568 0.009716 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 100.00 0.556525 -0.04055 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 12.37197 2.898918 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.191575 0.046285 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 0.04281 0.010031 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0 0 
02-12-09 102.86 5.50 2825.00 113.36 0.042568 0.01021 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.36 0.425685 0.100178 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 0 0 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.57 0 0 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.05 0.042568 0.009716 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.14 0.085619 0.019226 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.05 0.255411 0.058294 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.191575 0.046285 
02-12-09 102.86 5.50 2825.00 114.23 0 0 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.57 0.042568 0.010223 
02-12-09 102.83 5.50 2825.00 114.23 0.042568 0.011088 
02-12-09 102.86 5.50 2825.00 114.23 0 0 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.05 0.085137 0.019431 
02-12-09 102.83 5.50 2825.00 113.57 1.873014 0.459719 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.57 0 0 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.34 0.170274 0.039973 
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01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.05 0.256858 0.057146 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 100.00 0.085137 -0.0059 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.57 0.085137 0.020446 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.57 0.042568 0.010223 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.57 0.638527 0.153346 
02-12-09 102.83 5.50 2825.00 114.05 1.575034 0.403655 
02-12-09 102.86 5.50 2825.00 113.05 7.321781 1.704128 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.05 1.234486 0.281756 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 0 0 
02-12-09 102.83 5.50 2825.00 113.57 0 0 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.05 0.127705 0.029147 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 0.256858 0.060185 
02-12-09 102.83 5.50 2825.00 113.57 1.277055 0.313445 
02-12-09 102.83 5.50 2825.00 113.57 0.255411 0.062689 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 7.234821 1.695215 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 0.470905 0.110339 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 0.085619 0.020062 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 0.727763 0.170525 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.15326 0.037028 
02-12-09 102.83 5.50 2825.00 113.57 0.042568 0.010448 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 0.128429 0.030093 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 0.04281 0.010031 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.191575 0.046285 
02-12-09 102.86 5.50 2825.00 113.59 0.595959 0.146 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 0 0 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.306521 0.074056 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 0 0 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.88 0.306521 0.077696 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.038315 0.009257 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.07663 0.018514 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 0.342477 0.080247 
02-12-09 102.83 5.50 2825.00 113.57 0.085137 0.020896 
02-12-09 102.83 5.50 2825.00 113.57 0.723664 0.177619 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 0.428096 0.100309 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 0.04281 0.010031 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 0.385286 0.090278 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 1.647548 0.398051 
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01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 0.299667 0.070216 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.07663 0.018514 
02-12-09 102.83 5.50 2825.00 113.77 0.212842 0.053209 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.48 0.07663 0.018632 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 1.072822 0.259196 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 0 0 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 100.00 0.04281 -0.00312 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 2.183959 0.527649 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.613041 0.148112 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 10.01744 2.347221 
02-12-09 102.83 5.50 2825.00 113.57 0.042568 0.010448 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.536411 0.129598 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 0.941811 0.220679 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 0.984621 0.23071 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 0.128429 0.030093 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.268205 0.064799 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 112.62 0.15326 0.04173 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 100.00 0.114945 -0.00582 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.88 0.459781 0.116543 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.344836 0.083313 
02-12-09 102.83 5.50 2825.00 113.57 4.256849 1.044817 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 0.085619 0.020062 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 0.04281 0.010031 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.77 0.299667 0.071566 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.22989 0.055542 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.842932 0.203654 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.498096 0.120341 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 0.342477 0.080247 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.07663 0.018514 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 13.3994 3.139659 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.038315 0.009257 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.344836 0.083313 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.306521 0.074056 
02-12-09 102.83 5.50 2825.00 113.57 8.726541 2.141875 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 0 0 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.306521 0.074056 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.268205 0.064799 
2017]     THE COSTS OF BAILOUTS IN THE 491 
                                     2007-08 FINANCIAL CRISIS 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.268205 0.064799 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 0.04281 0.010031 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 6.168726 1.490376 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 6.321986 1.527404 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 0.214048 0.050154 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 1.532603 0.37028 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.22989 0.055542 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0 0 
02-12-09 102.83 5.50 2825.00 113.57 0.042568 0.010448 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.268205 0.064799 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.15326 0.037028 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 8.697521 2.101337 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.22989 0.055542 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.114945 0.027771 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.22989 0.055542 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.22989 0.055542 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 1.198668 0.280864 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 0 0 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.038315 0.009257 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.613041 0.148112 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.306521 0.074056 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.191575 0.046285 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 0.04281 0.010031 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 3.103521 0.749816 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 0 0 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 2.682055 0.647989 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.22989 0.055542 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.306521 0.074056 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 1.149452 0.27771 
02-12-09 102.83 5.50 2825.00 113.57 0.212842 0.052241 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 10.23012 2.471617 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.038315 0.009257 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0 0 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 1.187767 0.286967 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 100.00 0 0 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 0.899001 0.210648 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 112.62 1.992384 0.542493 
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03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 1.379342 0.333252 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.306521 0.074056 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0 0 
02-12-09 102.83 5.50 2825.00 113.57 0.170274 0.041793 
03-12-09 102.44 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.574726 0.131496 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.651356 0.157369 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.07663 0.018514 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.306521 0.074056 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.07663 0.018514 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 0 0 
02-12-09 102.83 5.50 2825.00 113.57 0.127705 0.031345 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0 0 
02-12-09 102.83 5.50 2825.00 113.57 0.255411 0.062689 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 0.556525 0.130401 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.15326 0.037028 
02-12-09 102.83 5.50 2825.00 113.57 0.042568 0.010448 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.07663 0.018514 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.268205 0.064799 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0 0 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 1.264397 0.305481 
03-12-09 102.44 5.00 2797.00 111.42 11.45621 2.621148 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.41 0.038315 0.009246 
03-12-09 102.44 5.00 2797.00 111.42 13.37196 3.059467 
02-12-09 102.83 5.50 2825.00 113.57 0 0 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 1.264397 0.305481 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 2.145644 0.518392 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.766301 0.18514 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 1.149452 0.27771 
02-12-09 102.83 5.50 2825.00 113.57 1.021644 0.250756 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 1.800808 0.435079 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 112.62 0.114945 0.031298 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.383151 0.09257 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 1.198668 0.280864 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.07663 0.018514 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 4.482863 1.083068 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.268205 0.064799 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.459781 0.111084 
2017]     THE COSTS OF BAILOUTS IN THE 493 
                                     2007-08 FINANCIAL CRISIS 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 2.682055 0.647989 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.114945 0.027771 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.41 0.038315 0.009246 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.41 0.114945 0.027739 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 100.00 0.344836 -0.01747 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.41 0.07663 0.018492 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.88 0 0 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.41 0.22989 0.055477 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.038315 0.009257 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.41 8.352685 2.015672 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.41 0.15326 0.036985 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.41 1.034507 0.249648 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.41 3.754877 0.906128 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.41 0.22989 0.055477 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.41 0.114945 0.027739 
03-12-09 102.44 5.00 2797.00 111.41 0.344836 0.078801 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.41 0.07663 0.018492 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.57 0.22989 0.056449 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0 0 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.038315 0.009257 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.41 0.306521 0.07397 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.41 0.191575 0.046231 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.41 1.762493 0.425325 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.41 0 0 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.41 0.038315 0.009246 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 1.839123 0.444336 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.41 0.038315 0.009246 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.41 8.927411 2.154366 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.57 0.038315 0.009408 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.88 0.15326 0.038848 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.88 0.038315 0.009712 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.41 13.14207 3.171448 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.41 0 0 
02-12-09 102.83 5.50 2825.00 113.57 0.723664 0.177619 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 7.088288 1.712544 
03-12-09 102.31 5.00 2797.00 111.42 38.35338 8.913489 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.41 0.07663 0.018492 
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03-12-09 102.22 5.00 2797.00 111.42 34.71345 8.154426 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.88 0.428096 0.103314 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 1.07024 0.250771 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.41 0.038315 0.009246 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 1.609233 0.388794 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 1.02743 0.240741 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.919562 0.222168 
02-12-09 102.83 5.50 2825.00 113.57 0.55339 0.135826 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 14.32984 3.462115 
02-12-09 102.70 5.50 2825.00 113.20 188.1527 45.21097 
02-12-09 103.11 6.00 2825.00 114.96 260.1477 64.40125 
03-12-09 101.87 5.00 2797.00 111.30 41.64848 10.06386 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.41 0.268205 0.064723 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 5.210849 1.258951 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 1.113049 0.260802 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.88 0.385286 0.092982 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 3.946452 0.95347 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.05 0.766233 0.174883 
03-12-09 102.44 5.00 2797.00 111.42 57.51092 13.15834 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.88 31.07976 7.500586 
02-12-09 102.83 5.50 2825.00 113.57 1.106781 0.271652 
02-12-09 102.83 5.50 2825.00 113.57 48.65579 11.94226 
02-12-09 102.43 5.50 2825.00 112.99 46.82534 11.34012 
03-12-09 101.88 5.00 2797.00 111.42 53.87099 13.16611 
02-12-09 102.83 5.50 2825.00 113.57 3.618322 0.888094 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 0.856192 0.200617 
03-12-09 102.44 5.00 2797.00 111.42 3.793192 0.867872 
03-12-09 101.88 5.00 2797.00 111.42 25.51784 6.236579 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 4.256849 1.052412 
02-12-09 102.72 5.50 2825.00 113.20 158.7805 38.0731 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.41 4.061397 0.980098 
06-26-09 102.09 5.00 2691.00 113.33 -0.9953 -0.29733 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 100.00 0.191575 -0.00971 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.41 0 0 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 112.62 0.114945 0.031298 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 0.191575 0.046285 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.34 0.297979 0.069952 
2017]     THE COSTS OF BAILOUTS IN THE 495 
                                     2007-08 FINANCIAL CRISIS 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.41 0.07663 0.018492 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.41 0.114945 0.027739 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.41 0.038315 0.009246 
06-26-09 102.09 5.00 2691.00 111.11 -0.07373 -0.01767 
06-26-09 102.09 5.00 2691.00 111.11 -0.14745 -0.03534 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.10 0.344836 0.08048 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.41 0 0 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.41 0 0 
06-26-09 102.09 5.00 2691.00 111.11 -0.07373 -0.01767 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.41 0.07663 0.018492 
06-22-09 100.84 5.00 2695.00 111.22 -32.8199 -9.14682 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.11 -0.72411 -0.18077 
02-12-09 102.86 5.50 2825.00 113.59 0.681096 0.166857 
03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.42 2.337219 0.564677 
06-26-09 102.09 5.00 2691.00 111.11 -0.11059 -0.02651 
06-26-09 102.09 5.00 2691.00 111.11 -0.03686 -0.00884 
06-22-09 100.84 5.00 2695.00 111.11 -0.25842 -0.07129 
06-22-09 100.84 5.00 2695.00 111.11 -0.29534 -0.08148 
06-26-09 102.09 5.00 2691.00 111.11 -0.25804 -0.06185 
06-22-09 100.65 5.00 2695.00 111.11 -5.90685 -1.66284 
06-26-09 102.09 5.00 2691.00 111.11 -0.14745 -0.03534 
06-26-09 102.09 5.00 2691.00 111.11 -0.03686 -0.00884 
06-26-09 102.09 5.00 2691.00 111.11 -0.36863 -0.08836 
06-26-09 102.09 5.00 2691.00 111.11 -6.85652 -1.64343 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.11 -0.21723 -0.05423 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.11 -3.87399 -0.96713 
06-26-09 102.09 5.00 2691.00 111.11 -0.14745 -0.03534 
06-26-09 102.09 5.00 2691.00 111.11 -0.22118 -0.05301 
06-26-09 101.99 5.00 2691.00 111.22 -2.83845 -0.69649 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.22 -0.21723 -0.05485 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.10 0 0 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.10 -0.28964 -0.07222 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.10 -0.36205 -0.09028 
06-26-09 101.99 5.00 2691.00 111.10 -0.25804 -0.06252 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.11 -2.93264 -0.73213 
06-26-09 102.09 5.00 2691.00 111.10 -0.2949 -0.0706 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.11 -0.07241 -0.01808 
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03-12-09 101.98 5.00 2797.00 111.49 0.038315 0.009328 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.11 -0.6879 -0.17173 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.11 -0.36205 -0.09039 
06-22-09 100.65 5.00 2695.00 111.11 -5.53767 -1.55892 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.11 -9.34101 -2.33196 
06-26-09 101.99 5.00 2691.00 111.11 -0.33177 -0.08048 
06-26-09 102.09 5.00 2691.00 111.11 -0.33177 -0.07952 
06-26-09 101.99 5.00 2691.00 111.11 -6.3773 -1.54703 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.11 -0.14482 -0.03615 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.11 -0.03621 -0.00904 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.11 -0.03621 -0.00904 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.10 -0.10862 -0.02708 
06-26-09 102.09 5.00 2691.00 111.11 -0.07373 -0.01767 
06-26-09 101.99 5.00 2691.00 111.10 -0.07373 -0.01786 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.11 -0.32585 -0.08135 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.11 -0.14482 -0.03615 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.11 -1.41201 -0.35251 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.11 -0.28964 -0.07231 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.11 -1.04996 -0.26212 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.11 -0.14482 -0.03615 
06-26-09 101.99 5.00 2691.00 111.11 -0.14745 -0.03577 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.11 -30.6298 -7.64665 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.11 -2.53438 -0.6327 
06-22-09 100.65 5.00 2695.00 111.22 -4.50397 -1.28064 
06-26-09 101.99 5.00 2691.00 111.11 -0.2949 -0.07154 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.10 0 0 
06-26-09 102.09 5.00 2691.00 111.11 -0.07373 -0.01767 
06-26-09 102.09 5.00 2691.00 111.11 -0.11059 -0.02651 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.11 -1.08616 -0.27116 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.11 -0.25344 -0.06327 
06-26-09 101.99 5.00 2691.00 111.11 -0.07373 -0.01788 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.11 -0.90514 -0.22596 
06-26-09 102.09 5.00 2691.00 111.11 -0.22118 -0.05301 
06-26-09 101.99 5.00 2691.00 111.11 -0.14745 -0.03577 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.11 -0.32585 -0.08135 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.11 -0.25344 -0.06327 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 100.00 -0.21723 0.011187 
2017]     THE COSTS OF BAILOUTS IN THE 497 
                                     2007-08 FINANCIAL CRISIS 
06-26-09 101.99 5.00 2691.00 111.11 -0.36863 -0.08942 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.11 -0.18103 -0.04519 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.17 -0.25344 -0.0637 
06-26-09 102.09 5.00 2691.00 111.11 -5.52945 -1.32535 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.11 -0.10862 -0.02712 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.62 -0.21723 -0.05721 
06-26-09 101.99 5.00 2691.00 111.11 -3.72316 -0.90318 
06-26-09 101.99 5.00 2691.00 111.11 -0.36863 -0.08942 
06-26-09 102.09 5.00 2691.00 111.11 -0.11059 -0.02651 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.11 -0.14482 -0.03615 
06-26-09 101.99 5.00 2691.00 111.11 -0.22118 -0.05365 
06-26-09 101.99 5.00 2691.00 111.11 -6.26671 -1.5202 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.11 -2.78782 -0.69597 
06-26-09 102.09 5.00 2691.00 111.11 -0.36863 -0.08836 
06-26-09 102.09 5.00 2691.00 111.11 -6.00867 -1.44021 
06-26-09 101.99 5.00 2691.00 111.11 -1.21648 -0.2951 
06-26-09 102.09 5.00 2691.00 111.11 0 0 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.62 -0.32585 -0.08581 
06-26-09 101.99 5.00 2691.00 111.11 -0.33177 -0.08048 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.11 -0.25344 -0.06327 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 9.931825 2.327159 
06-26-09 102.09 5.00 2691.00 111.11 -0.2949 -0.07069 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.73 -0.03621 -0.00965 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.11 -0.25344 -0.06327 
02-12-09 102.43 5.50 2825.00 113.27 16.30373 4.053188 
02-12-09 102.43 5.50 2825.00 113.27 28.22291 7.016355 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.11 -0.54308 -0.13558 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.11 -0.10862 -0.02712 
06-26-09 102.09 5.00 2691.00 111.44 -0.14745 -0.03663 
06-26-09 102.09 5.00 2691.00 111.11 -0.40549 -0.09719 
06-26-09 102.09 5.00 2691.00 111.11 -0.25804 -0.06185 
06-26-09 102.09 5.00 2691.00 100.00 -0.40549 0.022519 
06-26-09 102.09 5.00 2691.00 111.11 -0.18432 -0.04418 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.11 0 0 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.11 -0.18103 -0.04519 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.11 -0.07241 -0.01808 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.11 -0.10862 -0.02712 
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06-26-09 102.09 5.00 2691.00 111.22 -5.89808 -1.43016 
06-26-09 102.09 5.00 2691.00 111.11 -0.07373 -0.01767 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.62 -0.07241 -0.01907 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.11 -3.62055 -0.90386 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.11 -4.19984 -1.04848 
06-26-09 102.09 5.00 2691.00 111.11 -0.25804 -0.06185 
06-26-09 102.09 5.00 2691.00 111.11 -0.2949 -0.07069 
06-26-09 101.99 5.00 2691.00 111.44 -0.03686 -0.00926 
06-26-09 102.09 5.00 2691.00 100.00 -0.25804 0.01433 
06-26-09 102.09 5.00 2691.00 111.17 -0.07373 -0.01779 
06-26-09 102.09 5.00 2691.00 111.62 -0.22118 -0.05598 
06-26-09 102.09 5.00 2691.00 111.11 -0.2949 -0.07069 
06-26-09 101.99 5.00 2691.00 111.11 0 0 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.22 -8.87034 -2.2397 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.22 -0.14482 -0.03657 
06-22-09 98.48 4.50 2695.00 109.85 -33.1596 -11.5251 
06-22-09 98.48 4.50 2695.00 109.85 -18.2079 -6.32839 
06-26-09 102.09 5.00 2691.00 111.11 -0.07373 -0.01767 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 100.00 -0.07241 0.003729 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.22 0 0 
06-19-09 101.85 5.00 2698.00 111.11 -0.22175 -0.05455 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.22 -0.03621 -0.00914 
06-26-09 102.09 5.00 2691.00 111.11 -0.36863 -0.08836 
02-12-09 103.08 5.50 2825.00 113.57 36.14065 8.643074 
02-12-09 103.07 5.50 2825.00 113.57 146.3505 35.03662 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 59.67657 13.98302 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.57 37.15872 8.706786 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 112.83 28.52089 6.363177 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.05 0.428096 0.095244 
01-27-09 103.22 5.50 2841.00 113.59 21.40479 5.021723 
01-13-09 103.73 5.50 2855.00 113.05 21.51027 4.492952 
02-12-09 103.50 5.50 2825.00 113.05 16.85712 3.654326 
03-12-09 102.66 5.50 2797.00 113.57 42.14658 10.63107 
06-19-09 101.85 5.00 2698.00 111.11 -0.22175 -0.05455 
06-19-09 101.85 5.00 2698.00 111.11 -21.3992 -5.26434 
06-22-09 100.65 5.00 2695.00 111.11 -7.23589 -2.03698 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.11 -2.49818 -0.62366 
2017]     THE COSTS OF BAILOUTS IN THE 499 
                                     2007-08 FINANCIAL CRISIS 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.11 -0.14482 -0.03615 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.11 -0.36205 -0.09039 
06-26-09 102.09 5.00 2691.00 111.11 0 0 
06-22-09 100.84 5.00 2695.00 111.11 -0.33226 -0.09166 
06-19-09 101.85 5.00 2698.00 111.11 -0.18479 -0.04546 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.11 -0.79652 -0.19885 
06-22-09 100.84 5.00 2695.00 112.30 -0.22151 -0.06821 
06-22-09 100.84 5.00 2695.00 111.22 -0.47993 -0.13376 
06-26-09 102.09 5.00 2691.00 111.22 -0.22118 -0.05363 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.22 -0.36205 -0.09142 
06-22-09 100.84 5.00 2695.00 111.11 -0.14767 -0.04074 
06-22-09 100.84 5.00 2695.00 111.22 -0.11075 -0.03087 
03-31-09 100.34 4.00 2778.00 107.86 76.10959 18.73388 
06-26-09 101.99 5.00 2691.00 111.22 -8.03614 -1.97188 
06-26-09 102.09 5.00 2691.00 111.22 -0.14745 -0.03575 
06-22-09 100.84 5.00 2695.00 112.30 -5.53767 -1.70523 
06-26-09 101.99 5.00 2691.00 111.22 -5.52945 -1.3568 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.22 -3.14988 -0.79532 
06-22-09 100.84 5.00 2695.00 111.22 -1.25521 -0.34982 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 100.00 -0.18103 0.009323 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.88 7.449486 1.841721 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.17 -0.14482 -0.0364 
06-19-09 101.85 5.00 2698.00 111.11 -24.0233 -5.90988 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.05 13.28137 3.031305 
02-12-09 103.04 5.50 2825.00 113.05 33.41627 7.626841 
06-26-09 102.09 5.00 2691.00 111.22 -0.11059 -0.02682 
06-26-09 101.99 5.00 2691.00 111.22 -0.07373 -0.01809 
06-26-09 101.99 5.00 2691.00 111.22 -0.25804 -0.06332 
06-26-09 102.09 5.00 2691.00 100.00 -0.14745 0.008189 
06-26-09 102.09 5.00 2691.00 111.22 -0.03686 -0.00894 
06-22-09 100.65 5.00 2695.00 111.22 -5.53767 -1.57456 
06-26-09 102.09 5.00 2691.00 111.55 -0.11059 -0.02778 
06-26-09 102.09 5.00 2691.00 111.75 -0.33177 -0.08517 
06-22-09 100.84 5.00 2695.00 111.22 -0.25842 -0.07202 
06-22-09 100.84 5.00 2695.00 111.22 -0.11075 -0.03087 
06-22-09 98.48 4.50 2695.00 109.85 -3.92067 -1.36268 
06-22-09 100.84 5.00 2695.00 111.22 -0.03692 -0.01029 
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08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 112.30 -0.21723 -0.06126 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.22 -1.3396 -0.33824 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.22 -2.06371 -0.52107 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.22 -0.25344 -0.06399 
06-26-09 102.09 5.00 2691.00 111.22 -0.07373 -0.01788 
06-22-09 98.48 4.50 2695.00 109.85 -1.86066 -0.6467 
08-13-09 101.90 5.00 2643.00 111.22 -0.61549 -0.15541 
06-22-09 98.48 4.50 2695.00 109.85 -7.17682 -2.4944 
06-22-09 98.48 4.50 2695.00 109.85 -1.19614 -0.41573 
06-22-09 98.48 4.50 2695.00 109.85 -58.3117 -20.267 
06-22-09 98.48 4.50 2695.00 109.85 -9.07071 -3.15265 
03-11-10 105.58 5.50 2433.00 113.23 -0.14665 -0.02897 
02-19-09 103.11 6.00 2818.00 113.89 46.32329 10.45359 
02-19-09 102.88 5.50 2818.00 114.95 106.4548 29.42178 
   435,561.26 101,094.83 
   
   Total 
   536.506.09 
 
